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Within the last ten years, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit has adjudicated issues of major import in the
area of immigration and nationality law. The United States Su-
preme Court has reversed the majority of these holdings, often
reiterating holdings from other circuits. This article examines the
decisions of both of these courts, the precedents culminating in
these pronouncements, and the views of these courts as to their
own function in this area of law. The author concludes that de-
spite cautioning the Ninth Circuit to refrain from legislating law
judicially, the Supreme Court has itself been an activist court, al-
locating greater power to the federal government at the expense of
individual rights. This activism results from an abdication by
Congress of its duty to decide currently unresolved issues. The
courts differ in the direction that this activism has taken due to
differing ideals as to what constitutes the perfect system.
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INTRODUCTION
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals is the largest of the thirteen
federal appeals courts in the country and handles more cases subject
to Supreme Court review than any other circuit.1 Over the past ten
years, the United States Supreme Court has reversed Ninth Circuit
holdings in most of the Immigration and Nationality cases on which
it has granted certiorari. The cases fall into four categories within
the context of immigration and naturalization: (1) search and
seizure; (2) suspension of deportation; (3) proceedings to determine
the existence of an "entry" by a returning resident alien; and (4) the
use of equitable and collateral estoppel in the immigration context.
Legal scholars may explain the startling consistency of reversals
either as reflecting a "philosophical difference" between the two
courts,2 or as a mere statistical coincidence.3 An examination of
these pronouncements, the legislative history, and the case law,
reveals not only differences between the courts in their analysis of
the law, but great divergence of opinion with respect to the function
of the court itself. This article explores construction by both courts
of the applicable immigration law and the impact of its philosophy
of its own role upon the construction.
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
Interrogation
The Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act) confers upon any
immigration officer 4 the authority to interrogate, without warrant,
any alien or individual believed to be an alien, as to his right to be or
1. 9th Circuit Is '0 for 22' in High Court Reviews, L.A. Times, June 25, 1984,
at Al, col. 3.
2. "Clearly, there is a philosophical difference. The 9th Circuit is one of the
most liberal circuits in the country, due largely to an influx of appointments during the
Carter presidency . . . . It may be a case where the Supreme Court is particularly
watching 9th Circuit rulings." Gerald F. Uelman, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, Cal-
ifornia, quoted in id. If there is, indeed, a philosophical difference, that difference may
result from the changed composition of the Ninth Circuit during the Carter administra-
tion. Carter appointed 262 federal judges during his administration, including 15 to the
Ninth Circuit. Maher, Engine, Engine Number 9. . ., 5 CAL. LAW. 39 (1985).
3. 9th Circuit is 'Ofor 22' in High Court Reviews, supra note 1, at 16.
4. An "immigration officer" is any INS or other federal employee or class of
employees "designated by the Attorney General, individually or by regulation, to perform
the function of an immigration officer." Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(18),
8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(18) (1982) [herinafter cited as INA]. By regulation, immigration
officers include immigration inspectors and examiners, border patrol agents, deportation
officers, trial attorneys, pilots, detention officers, investigators, attorneys, paralegal spe-
cialists, naturalization examiners, and supervisory officers of such employees. 8 C.F.R. §
103.1(i) (1984). Immigration officers may exercise their authority anywhere in the
United States. 8 C.F.R. § 287.1(c) (1984). For a discussion as to the place and manner
in which an officer may exercise this authority, see IA C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD,
IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 5.2 (1984).
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to remain in the United States.' The officer need not have probable
cause for this inquiry. The Ninth Circuit, in a decision subsequently
affirmed by the Supreme Court,6 somewhat limited this authority to
conform to the dictates of the Fourth Amendment.
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce involved an appeal from a con-
viction for transporting illegal aliens. The conviction stemmed from
a warrantless stop near, but not at, the San Clemente checkpoint."
The court found that such a stop and resulting interrogation must be
supported by a founded suspicion that the individuals questioned are
illegal aliens. Membership in a particular ethnic group, however,
could not by itself constitute founded suspicion.9
The Supreme Court, affirming, explained that the validity of the
stop and inquiry rests upon whether it is "reasonably related in scope
to the justification for [its] initiation."' 10 Any inquiry beyond mere
questioning as to the individual's citizenship and immigration status
requires consent or probable cause." The Court enumerated several
factors to be considered in deciding whether reasonable suspicion ex-
isted: (1) the character of the area, including its proximity to the
border; (2) the usual traffic patterns, and prior experience with alien
traffic; (3) information regarding recent illegal border crossings; (4)
the driver's behavior; (5) the appearance of the vehicle; and, (6) the
characteristic appearance of persons living in Mexico.' 2 The Court
5. INA § 287(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a) (1982). See, e.g., Cheung Tin Wong v.
INS, 468 F.2d 1123 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
6. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
7. 499 F.2d 1109 (9th Cir. 1974).
8. The INS maintains three types of surveillance operations. The first type of
operation consists of permanent checkpoints located at certain intersections. The second
operation consists of temporary checkpoints existing from time to time at a variety of
locations. The third manner of surveillance is the roving patrol. See Almeida-Sanchez v.
United States, 413 U.S. 266, 268 (1973).
The court premised its characterization of San Clemente as a fixed checkpoint in
United States v. Morgan, 501 F.2d 1351 (9th Cir. 1974) (en bane). With respect to its
characterization of the stop in Brignoni-Ponce, the court stated: "Although the line be-
tween a roving-patrol stop and a fixed-checkpoint stop is not a clear one, we hold that
pursuing a passing car and flagging it to the side of the road is conduct more characteris-
tic of a roving-patrol stop than of a fixed-checkpoint stop." Brignoni-Ponce, 499 F.2d at
1110.
9. "[T]here is nothing suspicious about six persons riding in a sedan. The con-
duct does not become suspicious simply because the skins of th occupants are non-
white." Id. at 1112 (quoting United States v. Mallides, 473 F.2d 859, 861 (9th Cir.
1973)).
10. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 881 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29
(1968)).
11. Id. at 881-82.
12. Id. at 884-86. At least one court has since relied upon these criteria and the
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specifically refrained from deciding whether a warrant could validly
issue for an entire area based upon area conditions.13 The Court em-
phasized that congressional power over aliens could not be allowed to
diminish the Fourth Amendment rights of citizens who might be
mistaken for aliens.14 In a concurring opinion, Justice White argued
that the decision of the Court essentially dismantled the governmen-
tal system of interception and that law enforcement functions more
properly rested with the executive and legislative branches.
15
The Ninth Circuit reiterated its philosophy in United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte.'6 Three individuals had been stopped at the San
Clemente checkpoint, pursuant to an area warrant.' 7 In holding the
need for individualized suspicion to find INS stops of vehicles on the highway violative of
the Fourth Amendment. Niacio v. INS, 595 F. Supp. 19 (E.D. Wash. 1984).
13. Brignoni-Ponce, 442 U.S. at 882 n.7.
14. Id. at 884. The Fourth Amendment applies to all seizures of a person, includ-
ing seizures that involved only a brief detention that falls short of arrest. Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1 (1968). An individual is "seized" "whenever a police officer accosts an indi-
vidual and restrains his freedom to walk away. . . ." Id. at 16. The Fourth Amendment
requires that a seizure be "reasonable." U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV. Whether a particular
seizure is reasonable depends upon the balance between the public interest and the indi-
vidual's right to personal security free from the arbitrary interference by law enforce-
ment officers. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-21. See also Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S.
523, 536-37 (1967).
15. The entire system, however, has been notably unsuccessful in deterring or
stemming this heavy flow [of illegal aliens]; and its costs, including added burdens on the
courts, have been substantial. Perhaps the Judiciary should not strain to accommodate
the requirements of the Fourth Amendment to the needs of a system which at best can
demonstrate only minimal effectiveness as long as it is lawful for business firms and
others to employ aliens who are illegally in the country. This problem, which ordinary
law enforcement has not been able to solve, essentially poses questions of national policy
and is chiefly the business of Congress and the Executive Branch rather than the courts.
Brignoni-Ponce, 442 U.S. at 915.
16. 514 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1975).
17. The warrant read as follows:
TO: Any authorized officer of the Immigration and Naturalization Service in-
cluding any agent of the U.S. Border Patrol:
Application having been made by the United States for a warrant of inspec-
tion for the operation of a fixed checkpoint at San Clemente, California, and
having reviewed and considered the affidavits of Robert D. McCord and Rich-
ard Wischknemper, and having reviewed and considered the findings made by
the United States District Court in United States v. Baca, 368 F. Supp. 398
(S.D. Cal. 1973) and having reviewed and considered a copy of the certified
reporter's transcript of he sworn testimony of Deputy Chief Border Patrol
Agent Richard E. Batchelor presented in the Baca case.
I am satisfied that there is probable cause to believe that mass violations of
the Immigration laws of the United States (Title 8, United States Code) have
been and are being committed at a point known as the Border Patrol check-
point on the northbound lanes of Interstate Highway Route 5, approximately
five miles south of San Clemente, California.
Wherefore, You are Hereby Commanded:
(1) to conduct an immigration traffic checkpoint on the northbound lanes of
Interstate Route 5, five miles south of San Clemente, California, and;
(2) to stop northbound motor vehicles for the purpose of making routine in-
quiries to determine the nationality and/or immigration status of the occupants
of said vehicles, and;
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warrant invalid and reversing the resulting convictions, the court
noted that the warrant failed to specify any individuals, and thus
gave border patrol agents blanket auithority to stop anyone at their
discretion. The court condemned the warrant as authorizing the con-
duct denounced in Brignoni-Ponce.18 Further, the court emphasized
that the fact that protection of a constitutional right would lay a
heavy burden upon the government was insufficient grounds for the
failure to protect that right. 19 In his dissent, Judge Carter speculated
that a majority of the Supreme Court would support the legality of a
stop pursuant to an area warrant 2 0 He characterized the border pa-
trol action here as a stop and interrogation, necessitating only a tem-
(3) to conduct a routine inspection of said vehicles for the presence of aliens,
and;
(4) since the flow of alien traffic occurs at all hours of the day, and since
limited operation of the traffic checkpoint would tend to defeat its purpose, the
operation of this checkpoint may be conducted at any time of day or night,
and;
(5) a copy of the warrant shall be displayed in a conspicuous manner at the
checkpoint location and upon request, shall be given to any person detained.
(6) The Immigration and Naturalization Service shall file a written return
on this warrant containing the following:
A. The approximate number of vehicles passing through the checkpoint
during the hours of operation;
B. The approximate number of vehicles stopped for questioning concerning
citizenship status;
C. The number of vehicles inspected;
D. The number of vehicles in which aliens were discovered;
E. A recapitulation of the total number of deportable aliens apprehended;
F. An inventory of any property seized.
(7) This warrant shall be returned within ten days of this date, as required
by law.
Id. at 311 n.2. The record did not reveal why the INS sought a warrant. Prior to the
application for the warrant, however, the Ninth Circuit had held unconstitutional a stop
and search conducted without a warrant at a permanent checkpoint. See United States v.
Bowen, 500 F.2d 960 (9th Cir. 1974), affid 422 U.S. 916 (1975); United States v. Jua-
rez-Rodriguez, 498 F.2d 7 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied 430 U.S. 985, reh'g denied, 431
U.S. 975 (1977). Shortly after the warrant issued, the court also found unconstitutional
routine checkpoint stops conducted without a warrant. See United States v. Esquer-Ri-
vera, 500 F.2d 313 (9th Cir. 1974).
18. Martinez-Fuerte, 514 F.2d at 315-16.
19. In explaining its criticism of the government's reasoning, the court speculated
that:
the influx of illegal aliens could conceivably be stemmed in various ways. It is
not our business to tell the executive how to enforce the laws, nor to tell the
Congress what laws to enact. But when, as in this case, the government chooses
to pitch its case upon an alleged unavoidable necessity if the laws are to be
successfully enforced, we feel compelled to comment on the claimed necessity.
Id. at 318.
20. Id. at 323. Justice Carter based his opinion on the various opinions expressed
in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973), discussed supra note 8.
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porary slowdown of the vehicle, resulting in a lesser degree of intru-
sion than that occasioned by a roving patrol.
21
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit decision in Marti-
nez-Fuerte2 2 and upheld the legality of the stops despite the absence
of reasonable suspicion by border patrol agents. The Court found the
public interest was. substantial because of the impossibility of con-
trolling the flow of illegal aliens from the border. Further, the re-
quirement of reasonable suspicion for stops on major routes would be
"impractical" because of the flow of traffic. The Court reasoned that
checkpoint stops involve less discretionary enforcement activity than
do other types of -stops and, in any event, the exercise of that discre-
tion is subject to judicial review. The expectation of privacy in an
automobile was viewed as different than that in a dwelling.23
The Supreme Court acknowledged that individual suspicion was
usually a prerequsite to a constitutional search or seizure. It quali-
fied that requirement, however, by finding that "the Fourth Amend-
ment imposes no irreducible requirement of such suspicion. 24 The
Court simultaneously limited Brignoni-Ponce by upholding the con-
stitutionality of selective referrals to the secondary inspection area
on the sole basis of apparent Mexican ancestry. The Court justified
its decision by noting that the San Clemente checkpoint differed
from the roving patrols involved in Brignoni-Ponce,2' but failed,
however, to explain why that distinction justified disparate
treatment.
Justices Brennan and Marshall registered a strong dissent in Mar-
tinez-Fuerte, characterizing the majority holding as a "defacement
of Fourth Amendment protections, 26 and contrary to prior Court
holdings. The dissent defined the status quo under the Fourth
Amendment as one of nonintrusion,2 8 a requirement the majority
was willing to minimize merely because it could not be satisfied con-
veniently.29 Justices Brennan and Marshall found especially unpalat-
able the wide discretion the ruling gave law enforcement officers
30
21. Martinez-Fuerte, 514 F.2d at 324.
22. 428 U.S. 543 (1976). The Court, in so doing, resolved a conflict between the
Ninth Circuit and a companion case arising in the Fifth Circuit.
23. Id. at 561.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 563.
26. Id. at 570.
27. See United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975); Brignoni-Ponce v. United
States, 422 U.S. 873 (1975); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
28. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 572 n.2.
29. Id. at 575.
30. The dissent accurately pointed out the contradiction in the majority's reason-
ing. The majority indicated that checkpoint stops involve less discretion than roving pa-
trols. It also indicated that the officers must have wide discretion in selecting the motor-
ists to be diverted. Id. at 576.
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and expressed grave concern over the possible consequences of such
a pronouncement.31
After Martinez-Fuerte, the Seventh Circuit, in Illinois Migrant
Council v. Pilliod, found street stops based upon an appearance of
Mexican ancestry or upon a Spanish surname unconstitutional.3 2 In
response to the governmental claim of nonjusticiability, the court
noted that an injunction against such stops did not involve the court
in the internal affairs of the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS), nor did it require that agency to act affirmatively. It merely
required compliance with the Constitution. The displeasure of the
executive branch was immaterial to the validity of the injunction.3
31. The cornerstone of this society, indeed of any free society, is orderly pro-
cedure. The Constitution, as originally adopted, was therefore, in great measure,
a procedural document. For the same reasons the drafters of the Bill of Rights
largely placed their faith in procedural limitations on government action. The
Fourth Amendment's requirement that searches and seizures be reasonable en-
forces this fundamental understanding in erecting its buffer against the arbi-
trary treatment of citizens by government. But to permit, as the Court does
today, police discretion to supplant the objectivity of reason and, thereby, expe-
diency to reign in the place of order, is to undermine Fourth Amendment safe-
guards and threaten erosion of the cornerstone of our system of government, for,
as Mr. Justice Frankfurter reminded us, "[tihe history of American freedom is,
in no small measure, the history of procedure."
Id. at 578 (quoting Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 414 (1945)).
One scholar has explained the limits of discretion:
Discretion is not limited to what is authorized but includes all that is within
"the effective limits" on the officer's power .... Discretion includes interim
choices as well as final ones and procedural choices as well as substantive ones.
Discretion extends to methods, forms, timing, degrees of emphasis and many
other subsidiary factors.
An officer who decides what to do or not to do often (1) finds facts, (2) applies
law, and (3) decides what is desirable in the circumstances after the facts and
the law are known. Interpreting facts and interpreting law may both involve
some exercise of discretion, but the third of the three functions is usually the
largest element of discretion.
An officer who exercises discretion needs not only the facts which give rise to
the discretionary problem; he may also need facts to guide his exercise of
discretion.
K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES-TEXT-PROBLEMS 443 (6th ed. 1977). For a
thorough examination of the nature of discretionary justice, see K. DAVIS, DISCRETION-
ARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1977).
32. Illinois Migrant Council v. Pilliod, 540 F.2d 1062 (7th Cir. 1976), modified,
548 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1977).
33 . he dissent argues that the federal courts lack power to issue the injunc-
tion requested here because Congress has plenary authority to exclude aliens. It
is true that Congress has such power. It is also true that the INS agents act
pursuant to the authority granted by Congress. It is not true, however, as the
dissent's syllogism would have us hold, that the actions of INS officials are be-
yond judicial review so that we are barred from granting relief. As with any
provision of the Constitution which purportedly grants Congress plenary power,
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The court ruled that an INS agent could engage an individual in
casual conversation. It concluded, however, that the INS agent must
have a reasonable suspicion that the individual was an illegal alien
prior to questioning and/or detainment.34
A district court in New York reached a similar conclusion in Mar-
quez v. Kiley.35 In that case, INS agents stopped several individuals
of Hispanic appearance on the street, pursuant to an area control
operation."6 The court, recognizing the realities of everyday life,
found it "in the nature of an oxymoron" to speak of a "casual" in-
quiry between a person suspected of alienage and an armed govern-
ment officer.
37
The Ninth Circuit in United States v. Cortez,3 8 consistent with its
prior emphasis upon the need for founded suspicion39 as the basis for
a stop, reversed a conviction premised solely on a profile of an indi-
vidual. The Supreme Court" reversed the Ninth Circuit ruling, find-
ing that based upon "the whole picture," the detaining officers had
met the Brignoni-Ponce requirement of founded suspicion.41 In so
holding, however, the Court encroached even further upon the pro-
whether exercise of that authority is beyond judicial review depends upon the
context in which the officer acts .... This case ... involves the legality of
INS questioning individuals already present in this country, regardless of
whether those individuals are transient aliens, permanent residents, or natural-
born citizens. Congress' power to exclude aliens cannot be interpreted so
broadly as to limit the Fourth Amendment rights of those present in the United
States. Consequently, the subject matter of this lawsuit is properly before the
district court.
Id. at 1068 n.5. (emphasis added).
34. Id. at 1070.
35. 436 F. Supp. 100 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
36. The "Investigator's Handbook" advises:
5. Area control operations are basically selective on-the-scene interrogations
which are authorized by section 287. It should be remembered that these in-
quiries are interrogations pursuant to section 287(a)(1), and may not necessa-
rily involve an arrest. Under the authority of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)
interrogation may involve some measure of brief restraint.
Id. at 106.
37. Id. at 113-14.
38. 595 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1979).
39. "The founded suspicion test must be read as requiring some additional fact or
facts which focus suspicion on the individual or vehicle stopped." Id. at 508. The founded
suspicion test is equivalent to the reasonable suspicion required by Brignoni-Ponce.
40. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981).
41. Courts have used a variety of terms to capture the elusive concept of what
cause is sufficient to authorize police to stop a person. Terms like "articulable reasons"
and "founded suspicion" are not self-defining; they fall short of providing clear guidance
dispositive of the myriad factual situations that arise. But the essence of all that has been
written is that the totality of the circumstances - the whole picture - must be taken
into account. Based upon that whole picture the detaining officers must have a particu-
larized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal
activity.
Id. at 417-18. For a more recent application of "the whole picture" standard, see United
States v. Garcia, 732 F.2d 1221 (5th Cir. 1984).
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tections enunciated in Brignoni-Ponce, already eroded by Martinez-
Fuerte.
Brignoni-Ponce imposed reasonable suspicion as a prerequisite to a
roving patrol stop but found Mexican ancestry alone insufficient to
constitute reasonable suspicion. Unlike the Ninth Circuit, however,
the Supreme Court in Martinez-Fuerte did not view nonintrusion as
the status quo. Instead, the Court viewed the degree of intrusion oc-
casioned by the stops to be minimal and outweighed by the govern-
ment's need to enforce the immigration laws. The Court character-
ized the nature of the intrusion as different from that in Brignoni-
Ponce, noting that subjective intrusion at a checkpoint was signifi-
cantly less than that conducted by a roving patrol.42
The Ninth Circuit Cortez decision restores the discretion exercised
by the INS prior to Brignoni-Ponce by allowing a roving patrol to
stop individuals who may be guilty of nothing more than driving a
particular type of vehicle at a particular time of the day.43 The fact
that an individual may conform to a profile developed from general
characteristics does not constitute the founded suspicion particular to
an individual required by Brignoni-Ponce. Such an approach permits
the possibility of increased government misconduct in the exercise of
this discretion.
Such abuses conceivably could be directed at particular ethnic
groups. The Supreme Court in Martinez-Fuerte declared that appar-
ent Mexican ancestry was sufficient to support referral to the second-
ary inspection area of a checkpoint.44 Cortez lends credence to the
proposition that a particular ancestry, together with several other
factors, can be the basis for a stop. Consequently, where an area is
densely populated by a particular ethnic group, a large percentage of
such stops, may be intrusions on individuals lawfully in the United
States.45
The possibility that misconduct will remain uncorrected is great.
Many individuals are reluctant to assume the emotional and finan-
cial burden of long-term litigation to remedy a situation which, al-
though it exists, rarely touches their lives. Although the INS pro-
vides guidance as to what constitutes a stop and what an officer may
42. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 558.
43. Justice Douglas, in his concurring opinion in Brignoni-Ponce, expressed his
displeasure with even the suspicion test as a prerequisite, noting that it would allow the
police to interfere with a law-abiding citizen whose only transgression was a noncon-
formist appearance. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 889.
44. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 575.
45. See, e.g., Nicacio v. INS, 595 F. Supp. 19 (E.D. Wash. 1984).
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do pursuant to a stop, the agency has not delineated which factors
give rise to an individualized founded suspicion. Indeed, the Ninth
Circuit Cortez decision obviates the need for such caution.
Searches
The Immigration and Nationality Act permits immigration of-
ficers to conduct warrantless searches. 46 This authorization includes
the power to board and search vessels, conveyances, and vehicles
within a reasonable distance47 from any external boundary of the
United States.48 Until 1973, the majority of lower court decisions
upheld such searches in the absence of probable cause or warrant.49
The Supreme Court, in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States,50 recog-
nized the constitutional difficulties inherent in such an approach.
The Court reversed a Ninth Circuit decision that upheld a conviction
resulting from a search conducted by a roving patrol without proba-
ble cause.
51
46. INA § 287(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a) (1982).
47. Regulations define "reasonable distance" as a maximum of 100 air miles from
the border. 8 C.F.R. §§ 287.1(a)(b) (1984).
48. Immigration officers are also authorized to board and search any vessel, con-
veyance or vehicle which they believe is bringing aliens into the United States. INA §
235(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a) (1982). See also 8 C.F.R. § 287.1 (e)(f) (1984).
49. For a discussion of these lower court cases, see IA C. GORDON & H. ROSEN-
FIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 5.2(c) (1984).
50. 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
51. United States v. Almeida-Sanchez, 452 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1971) (per
curiam).
Judge Browning registered a sharp dissent. He noted first that a valid border search in
the absence of probable cause necessitated a direct relationship to an entry across the
border. He found no basis for the court's requirement of probable cause in searches for
contraband and the absence of such a requirement in searches for persons. Id. at 463.
Judge Browning explained that the statutory language was not conclusive with respect to
the need for probable cause: "Even assuming that the statute reflects Congress' under-
standing of the reach of the Fourth Amendment, Congress' view, though entitled to re-
spect, does not diminish the obligation of the judiciary to interpret and enforce the con-
stitutional mandate independently." Id. at 465.
The statute does not define the standards of reasonableness for government agents'
searches. Rather, it delegates the authority to be exercised by agents in accordance with
constitutional limitations. Congress was aware of the constitutional limitations upon the
immigration officers' authority.
It has been repeatedly held that the right to exclude or to expel all aliens or
any class of aliens, absolutely or upon certain conditions, in war or in peace, is
an inherent and inalienable right of every sovereign and independent nation,
essential to its safety, its independence, and its welfare; that this power to ex-
clude and to expel aliens, being a power affecting international relations, is
vested in the political departments of the Government, and is to be regulated
by treaty or by act of Congress and to be executed by the executive authority
according to the regulations so established, except so far as the judicial de-
partment . . . is required by the paramount law of the Constitution to
intervene.
H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 1654 (emphasis added).
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The Supreme Court, echoing Judge Browning's dissent in the
Ninth Circuit opinion, found that Congress could not authorize a
violation of the Constitution. The plurality opinion defined the
Court's duty to mandate the interpretation of the statute in a man-
ner consistent with the Fourth Amendment.5 2 It held that searches
of this kind were appropriate at the border and its functional
equivalent, but were otherwise unreasonable absent probable cause
or consent.5 3 Four justices registered a sharp dissent,"5 preferring to
defer to congressional judgment.5 5 Justice Powell, concurring in the
plurality opinion, expressed his approval of an area search warrant
in a footnote.5 6
52. "The needs of law enforcement stand in constant tension with the Constitu-
tion's protections of the individual against certain exercises of official power. It is pre-
cisely the predictability of these pressures that counsels a resolute loyalty to constitu-
tional safeguards." Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 273.
The Fourth Amendment provides that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
Cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV. Probable
cause is not required where the search constitutes a "border search." This exception is
based upon "the inherent right of sovereignty to protect its territorial integrity against
intrusion of unauthorized persons or things." Almeida-Sanchez, 452 F.2d at 462 (citing
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925)). Such searches may occur not on only at
the border, but at its functional equivalents. Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 272-73.
However, since the exception is in derogation of Fourth Amendment principles, it should
be narrowly construed. Almeida-Sanchez, 452 F.2d at 462.
53. The plurality explained what was meant by a functional equivalent:
For example, searches at an established station near the border, at a point
marking the confluence of two or more roads that extend from the border,
might be functional equivalents of border searches. For another example, a
search of the passengers and cargo of an airplane arriving at a St. Louis air-
port after a nonstop flight from Mexico City would clearly be the functional
equivalent of a border search.
Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 272-73.
54. Justice White authored the dissenting opinion and was joined by Justices
Blackmun, Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger.
55. The judgment of Congress obviously was that there are circumstances in
which it is reasonably necessary, in the enforcement of the immigration laws, to
search vehicles and other private property for aliens, without warrant or proba-
ble cause, and at locations other than at the border. To disagree with this legis-
lative judgment is to invalidate 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3) in the face of the con-
trary opinion of Congress that its legislation comported with the standard of
reasonableness of the Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 293.
56. "There is no reason why a judicial officer could not approve where appropri-
ate a series of roving searches over the course of several days or weeks. Experience with
an initial search or series of searches would be highly relevant in considering applications
for renewal of a warrant .... " Id. at 283 n.3.
Although standards for probable cause in the context of this case are relatively
unstructured . . . there are a number of relevant factors which would merit
consideration: they include (i) the frequency with which aliens illegally in the
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The Almeida-Sanchez opinion created confusion 57 until the Su-
preme Court, in United States v. Ortiz, clarified its position and de-
clared that an automobile search away from the border or its func-
tional equivalent required consent or probable cause. 8 In so holding,
the Court noted that any search, regardless of its location, necessa-
rily entailed an intrusion of privacy and the possibility of
embarrassment.
5 9
Several circuits recently have ruled on the legality of searches un-
dertaken in public areas and workplaces. Blackie's House of Beef,
Inc. v. Castillo6" addressed the validity of two warrants obtained by
the INS based on information concerning the employment of illegal
aliens at a restaurant. The court of appeals of the District of Colum-
bia Circuit held invalid the first warrant, which was obtained pursu-
ant to Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The
court concluded that warrants obtained pursuant to that rule aid in
criminal investigations; INS investigations were characterized by the
court as essentially civil law enforcement activities."' The second
warrant, which was premised upon an agent's surveillance of the res-
country are known or reasonably believed to be transported within a particular
area; (ii) the proximity of the area in question to the border; (iii) the extensive-
ness and geographic characteristics of the area, including the roads therein and
the extent of their use; and (iv) the probable degree of interference with the
rights of innocent persons, taking into account the scope of the proposed
search, its duration, and the concentration of illegal alien traffic in relation to
the general traffic of the road or area.
In short, the determination of whether a warrant should be issued for an area
search involves a balancing of the legitimate interests of law enforcement with
protected Fourth Amendment rights. This presents the type of delicate ques-
tion of constitutional judgment which ought to be resolved by the Judiciary
rather than the Executive . . . . This is precisely the discretion to invade pri-
vate property which we have consistently circumscribed by a requirement that
a disinterested party warrant the need to search.
Id. at 283-84 (quoting Camara, 387 U.S. at 532-33).
57. See IA C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE
§ 5.2c (1984). The Supreme Court addressed the retroactive application of Almeida-
Sanchez in Bowen v. United States, 422 U.S. 916 (1975), aff'g United States v. Bowen,
500 F.2d 960 (9th Cir. 1974). The Supreme Court in Bowen relied upon its holding in
United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975), rev'g 500 F.2d 985 (9th Cir. 1974).
58. United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975). The Supreme Court affirmed an
unreported Ninth Circuit decision. Id. at 892.
59. While the differences between a roving patrol and a checkpoint would be sig-
nificant in determining the propriety of a stop, which is considerably less intrusive than a
search, . . . they do not appear to make any difference in the search itself. The greater
regularity attending the stop does not mitigate the invasion of privacy that a search en-
tails. Nor do checkpoint procedures significantly reduce the likelihood of embarrassment.
Motorists whose cars are searched, unlike those who are only questioned, may not be
reassured by seeing that the Border Patrol searches other cars as well. Where only a few
are singled out for a search . . . motorists may find the searches especially offensive.
Id. at 895. The Court specifically refrained from deciding whether checkpoints and rov-
ing patrols should be treated the same for all purposes. Id. at 897 n.3.
60. 659 F.2d 1211 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 940 (1982).
61. Id. at 1228.
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taurant and information received from outside sources, was upheld.
The INS claimed its authority to search derived from its general
powers to question aliens and to enforce immigration laws. 2 The
warrant limited the search to daylight hours within ten days of the
order. It permitted the search of "any locked rooms on the premises
in order to locate aliens in the United States without legal
authority."63
The court upheld the validity of the second warrant in Blackie's
House of Beef despite its failure to identify specific persons sought.64
The lack of specificity as to identity of persons sought was counter-
balanced by the specificity of the places to be searched, the time and
scope of the search, and the strong supporting affidavits.6 5 The court
acknowledged the necessity of a warrant to search even commercial
premises, but warned that the commercial nature of the establish-
ment may "affect the type of evidence that constitutes probable
cause to obtain a search warrant in a particular case." 66 Emphasiz-
ing the public interest in enforcing immigration laws,67 the court
held that the balance of interests "preclud[ed] insistence upon...
individualized suspicion" as to the persons sought.6 '
Similarly, the Third Circuit in Babula v. INS 69 upheld the legality
of arrests in the absence of individualized suspicion. Based on infor-
mation from an informant, INS agents entered a factory without a
warrant in search of seven specific individuals. They surrounded the
building to prevent escapes. The agents ascertained that six of the
seven aliens sought were present legally and that the seventh had left
company employment one year earlier. The agents questioned all of
the employees regarding their right to be there,7 0 basing their suspi-
62. INA §§ 287, 103(a), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1357, 1103(a)(1982).
63. Blackie's House of Beef, 659 F.2d at 1216.
64. Probable cause to support a warrant requires probable cause as to the belief
that the legitimate object of a search is located in a particular place. A warrant is insuf-
ficient to justify the resulting invasion of privacy if either element is lacking. Steagald v.
United States, 451 U.S. 204, 213 (1981).
65. Blackie's House of Beef, 659 F.2d at 1227.
66. Id. at 1216-17 n.5.
67. Id. at 1220-21.
68. Id. at 1225 (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979)). One
court has since relied upon Blackie's House of Beef to permit INS reliance upon a less
rigid probable cause standard than that required for a criminal warrant. Kotler Indus-
tries, Inc. v. INS, 586 F. Supp. 72 (N.D. Il. 1984).
69. 665 F.2d 293 (3rd Cir. 1981).
70. The agents inquired whether (1) the individual was a Polish national; (2) the
individual possessed an alien registration receipt card; and (3) the individual held a tour-
ist visa. Id. at 295.
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cions upon the "milieu."' 7' Despite the inability of the employees to
leave or to avoid the questioning, the court held that no arrest oc-
curred until the individuals had responded to the questions. Such a
holding, however, precludes an alien subject to an area control oper-
ation from avoiding arrest.72 Yet, the Third Circuit found the intru-
sion no greater than it would have had the individuals been in a car.
Further, the court dispensed with the requirement of individualized
suspicion by noting that the INS action here involved neither a
search nor a private dwelling. 7a
Judge Adams, concurring, expressed concern that the search vio-
lated the dictates of Brignoni-Ponce.7 4 The agents had been in-
structed to question each employee regardless of whether reasonable
suspicion of his alien status existed. Adams noted that several courts
had found area control operations irreconcilable with the dictates of
the Fourth Amendment.
75
The Ninth Circuit, in ILGWU v. Sureck,76 was confronted with
the validity of an area control operation targeted at a factory. The
agents did not question all workers, but rather selected individuals
based upon their clothing, facial appearance, hair color and styling,
demeanor, language, and accent. 77 The court found that the agents
had created a detentive environment by their verbal authority,
badges, and handcuffs; the element of surprise; the sustained disrup-
tion of the working environment; and the methodical execution of
their operation down the rows of workers. Because a reasonable
worker would believe he was not free to leave, such action was char-
acterized as a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
71. Id. at 296.
72. We are aware that our holding that petitioners were not arrested until
they answered the three questions effectively precludes any illegal alien subject
to a similar area control operation from avoiding arrest. Whether or not the
petitioners knew the agents had the building surrounded, it is quite clear that,
once the building was surrounded, arrests were inevitable. Each petitioner could
flee, as petitioners Babula and Weszandize did, but such action gives an agent
reasonable suspicion that justifies further detention. Each could answer the
questions, as the other four petitioners did, thereby giving probable cause to
arrest. Or each could remain silent and refuse to produce evidence of his iden-
tity, although this too would justify an agent's further suspicion of illegal alien-
age ....
In short, although surrounding the factory and preventing any escape did lead
to arrest, petitioners were not in fact arrested until they had answered the
three questions, at which time the arresting agent had probable cause.
Id. at 298.
73. Id. at 296.
74. Id. at 300 (citing Illinois Migrant Council v. Pilliod, 548 F.2d 715 (7th Cir.
1977) (en banc), modifying 540 F.2d 1062 (7th Cir. 1976), afl'g 398 F. Supp. 882 (N.D.
I11. 1975)).
75. International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. Sureck, 681 F.2d 624 (9th
Cir. 1982), rev'd, INS v. Delgado, 104 S.Ct. 1758 (1984).
76. Id. at 627. One agent termed this a "multisensory" approach.
77. Id. at 634.
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ment.7 8 The court held that a standard which allowed detentive
questioning on the basis of alienage would diminish the privacy and
security of individuals legally here. 9
The Ninth Circuit, in rejecting the governmental analogy to Mar-
tinez-Fuerte, found that the INS action in Sureck was not minimally
intrusive but instead resulted in surprise and continuous disruption.
The court criticized the reasoning of Babula and found the Third
Circuit "milieu" standard inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment
and with the decision of the Seventh Circuit in Pilliod.80
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit ruling in Sureck,1
and characterized the encounter between the agents and the employ-
ees as consensual. The Court found that the actions of the employees
were restricted not by the agents, but rather by their voluntary obli-
gations to their employer.82 Justice Powell, concurring in the result,
compared the situation to that presented in Martinez-Fuerte. He
noted that the employees were allowed to continue working; that the
systematic and public nature of agent inquiries minimized fright;
and that the expectation of privacy in a plant is significantly less
than in a residence. He found no necessity for individualized suspi-
cion as a basis for the questioning.e
Justice Brennan vigorously objected to majority portrayal of the
facts, noting that the factory exits had been conspicuously guarded
and that the agents had been equipped with handcuffs. The objective
characteristics of the encounter, he insisted, necessitated its charac-
terization as a seizure. He found Martinez-Fuerte inapposite for sev-
eral reasons. First, the type of encounter in Surek provided agents
with a greater degree of discretion than they possessed at check-
points. Second, individuals expect a greater element of privacy in a
workplace ,than in a car. Third, no historical precedent existed for
the factory surveys which would make them expectable or predict-
able. 4 Brennan sharply criticized the majority for abandoning the
78. Id. at 639.
79. Id. at 642. The court concluded: "To find the factory survey procedures evi-
denced by the record before us constitutional would be. . . straining the Fourth Amend-
ment requirements in order to accommodate an intrusive and objectionable method of
immigration law enforcement. The Constitution, as we interpret it, cannot be so accom-
modating." Id. at 644.
80. INS v. Delgado, 104 S.Ct. 1758 (1984).
81. Id. at 4438.
82. Id. at 4439-40.
83. Id. at 4442-43.
84. No one doubts that the presence of large numbers of undocumented aliens in
this country creates law enforcement problems of titanic proportions for the INS. Nor
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Fourth Amendment as a means of solving the problem of illegal
immigration.8 5
The Ninth and Seventh Circuits stand alone in their commitment
to the Fourth Amendment and its requirement of individualized sus-
picion as a prerequisite to a search or seizure. The Supreme Court
appears to have abandoned its Brignoni-Ponce caution against the
diminution of Fourth Amendment rights through unwarranted em-
phasis upon congressional power over aliens. Instead, the Supreme
Court and the Second Circuit have been willing to analogize the
area control operation to the Martinez-Fuerte checkpoint procedure
and to uphold fewer safeguards in the interest of law enforcement.
In many respects, the area control operation is similar to the Al-
meida-Sanchez roving patrol situation and, consequently, presents
the same dangers which that decision sought to prevent. Intrusions
on the workplace involve surprise, as do searches by roving patrols.
An individual seeking to avoid passing through a checkpoint may
choose to take a different route. No such choice is available to the
employee at a targeted job site. He cannot avoid his voluntary obli-
gations to his employer without suffering the consequences of leaving
the premises during working hours. Thus, he is unable to avoid ar-
rest. Although the workplace encounter involves questioning rather
than the search for an alien, it is conducted in full view of all em-
does anyone question that this agency must be afforded considerable latitude in meeting
its delegated enforcement responsibilities. I am afraid, however, that the Court has be-
come so mesmerized by the magnitude of the problem that it has too easily allowed
Fourth Amendment freedoms to be sacrificed. Before we discard all efforts to respect the
commands of the Fourth Amendment in this troubling area, however, it is worth remem-
bering that the difficulties faced by the INS today are partly of our own making ....
In the face of these facts, it seems anomalous to insist that the INS must now
be permitted virtually unconstrained discretion to conduct wide-ranging
searches for undocumented aliens at otherwise lawful places of employment in
the interior of the United States. What this position amounts to, I submit, is an
admission that since we have allowed border enforcement to collapse and since
we are unwilling to require American employers to share any of the blame, we
must, as a matter of expediency, visit all of the burdens of this jury-rigged
enforcement scheme on the privacy interests of completely lawful citizens and
resident aliens who are subjected to these factory raids solely because they hap-
pen to work alongside some undocumented aliens. The average American, as
we have long recognized, expects some interference with his or her liberty when
seeking to cross the Nation's borders, but until today's decision no one would
ever have expected the same treatment while lawfully at work in the country's
interior. Because the conditions which spawned such expedient solutions are in
no sense the fault of those lawful workers, the Court, as the guardian of their
constitutional rights, should attend to this problem with greater sensitivity
before simply pronouncing the Fourth Amendment a dead letter in the context
of immigration enforcement. The answer to these problems, I suggest, does not
lie in abandoning our commitment to protecting the cherished rights secured
by the Fourth Amendment, but rather may be found by reexamining our immi-
gration policy.
Id. at 4444.
85. See id. at 4443.
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ployees. As Brennan noted, an individual expects greater privacy in
his workplace than in his car. The workplace is a relatively small,
recognizable community, allowing significantly less anonymity than
the long line of cars driven by unacquainted persons passing through
a permanent checkpoint.86 Consequently, the individual faces the
same degree of embarrassment in the workplace as that occassioned
by an encounter with a roving patrol.
The Supreme Court has emphasized the public interest in control-
ling immigration and considers this factor important enough to per-
mit the absence of particularized suspicion as a factor in the proba-
ble cause formulation. This allows INS agents a significantly greater
degree of discretion in the conduct of their investigations. Further-
more, it increases the possibility for abuse of that discretion, not only
vis-d-vis aliens unlawfully in the United States, but also with respect
to documented persons and citizens as well.
The Application of the Exclusionary Rule
The Supreme Court has similarly enhanced the possibility of
abuse by refusing to apply the exclusionary rule to deportation pro-
ceedings."7 Although the Court, in Lopez-Mendoza v. INS, applied
the same balancing test as the Ninth Circuit, 8 it weighed the cost-
86. The Supreme Court did not hold, however, that aliens have no rights under
the Fourth Amendment. The Board of Immigration Appeals has since relied upon the
Supreme Court's decision to find that a respondent in a deportation proceeding does not
have the right to a separate hearing on a motion to suppress evidence. In re Benitez,
Interim Dec. No. 2979 (BIA 1984).
87. Lopez-Mendoza v. INS, 705 F.2d 1059 (1983).
The case involves two Mexican aliens, Lopez-Mendoza and Sandoval-Sanchez. They
were found deportable in separate proceedings. The court of appeals consolidated their
separate petitions for review.
The INS arrested Lopez-Mendoza at his place of employment, without a warrant.
Although the owner refused to permit the agents to interview him during working hours,
one agent entered the shop and questioned him. The agent arrested him based upon his
responses, and subsequently prepared a "Record of Deportable Alien" (Form 1-213) and
an affidavit which Lopez-Mendoza executed. Counsel for Lopez-Mendoza moved to ter-
minate deportation proceedings, arguing that his client had been arrested illegally. The
Immigration Judge found the legality of the arrest irrelevant and admitted the affidavit
and Form 1-213 into evidence. The Immigration Judge found him deportable based on
this evidence.
Sandoval-Sanchez was arrested at his workplace following a disruptive INS search of
the plant. The plant manager had consented to the search. The Immigration Judge ruled
the arrest legal and ruled alternatively that the legality of the arrest was irrelevant. San-
doval-Sanchez was found deportable based upon the written record of his admissions.
88. Both courts applied the cost-benefit test established by United States v. Janis,
428 U.S. 433 (1976).
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benefit element of that formulation significantly differently.s9
The Ninth Circuit examined the strength of the connection be-
tween the purposes of the offending officers and the purposes of those
seeking to use the illegally seized evidence. The violation in Lopez-
Mendoza was both intra-sovereign and intra-agency. The arresting
officer used illegally obtained information to prepare the paperwork
the INS attorneys relied upon in deportation proceedings. Since the
offending officer and the prosecutor shared common goals, the deter-
rent effect of the exclusionary rule was maximized.9" The Ninth Cir-
cuit found existing deterrents ineffective. It characterized as unlikely
the possibilities that an illegal alien would sue an agent in his indi-
vidual capacity"1 or that internal discipline would be effective. 92 The
social cost of applying the rule was to be measured in terms of the
number of aliens who would succeed in escaping deportation because
of the suppression of illegally obtained evidence of alienage or illegal
status. The court predicted that few would do so. It ultimately con-
cluded that the marginal deterrent benefit of applying the exclusion-
ary rule to deportation proceedings far outweighed the social cost of
such application."
In support of its decision in Lopez-Mendoza, the Ninth Circuit
majority explained that the exclusionary rule had applied to deporta-
tion proceedings until 1979, when the Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA), in In re Sandoval, held that it did not apply.94 Although the
court did not premise its decision in Lopez-Mendoza on the nature of
89. Lopez-Mendoza, 705 F.2d at 1069.
90. Such an action is possible pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents
of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
91. "[W]e are hesitant to place sole responsibility for ensuring that citizens and
aliens alike are free from unwarranted government intrusions into their privacy on the
same officers responsible for patroling the borders and apprehending persons they suspect
are aliens in this country illegally." Lopez-Mendoza, 705 F.2d at 1059. For an examina-
tion of the effectiveness of an internal deterrent mechanism, see Note, The Administra-
tion of Complaints by Civilians Against the Police, 77 HARV. L. REV. 499 (1964).
92. Lopez-Mendoza, 705 F.2d at "1073.
93. In re Sandoval, 17 I. & N. Dec. 70 (BIA 1979). But see JA C. GORDON &
H, ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 5.2c (1977) ("It is undisputed
that the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures ap-
plies in deportation proceedings and that evidence obtained as the result of an unlawful
search cannot be used.")
94. In essence, civil and criminal proceedings walk hand in hand in in-
trasovereign wedlock ... [t]he government may have a criminal action against
an alien for violation of [the immigration laws] . . . thrown out because of fa-
tally contaminated evidence, and then turn right around and proceed against
him in a deportation proceeding of equal or greater consequence, relying on the
identical evidence. This is wrong .... Underlying the majority decision is the
premise that there is something inherent in a civil deportation proceeding, as
against a criminal proceeding, which makes the application of the rule (a) less
necessary, and (b) less effective. Neither of these assumptions is acceptable.
Lopez-Mendoza, 705 F.2d at 1065-66 n.9 (quoting Sandoval, 17 I. & N. Dec. at 95-96
(Appleman, dissenting)).
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the proceeding, it asserted that the exclusionary rule could apply to
deportation proceedings because of their quasi-criminal nature.9 5
The dissent, authored by Judge Alarcon and joined by Judges
Wright, Wallace, and Poole, characterized the majority holding in
Lopez-Mendoza as a "radical departure from existing law." 96 The
dissent disagreed with both the majority's analysis of prior case law
and its application of Janis.7 It found that the majority ruling con-
travened case precedent which characterized deportation as a regula-
tory proceeding. 98 The dissent premised much of its argument upon
the anticipated cost to the existing system of an increased number of
hearings dealing with significantly more complex issues.19 The dis-
sent ultimately concluded that policy questions regarding punish-
ment for the commission of unreasonable searches and seizures are
reserved for the executive and legislative branches of government.100
95. Id. at 1075.
96. Id. at 1076-86.
97. Id. at 1086-89.
98. Absent the applicability of the exclusionary rule, questions relating to de-
portability routinely involve simple factual allegations and matters of proof. When
Fourth Amendment issues are raised at deportation hearings, the result is a diversion of
attention from the main issues which those proceedings were created to resolve, both in
terms of the expertise of the administrative decision makers and of the structure of the
forum to accommodate inquiries into search and seizure questions. The result frequently
seems to be a long, confused record in which the issues are not clearly defined and in
which there is voluminous testimony, but the underlying facts [are] not sufficiently devel-
oped. The ensuing delays and inordinate amount of time spent on such cases at all levels
has an adverse impact on the effective administration of the immigration laws, which to
date (in view of the virtual absence of cases in which evidence has been ultimately ex-
cluded) has in no way been counterbalanced by any apparent productive result.
Id. at 1091 (quoting Sandoval, 17 I. & N. Dec. at 80).
99. Unlike the field of criminal law, the supervisory role over deportation is
committed to the political branches of our government. The power of Congress
over the admission of aliens and their right to remain "is necessarily very broad,
touching as it does basic aspects of national sovereignty, more particularly our
foreign relations and the national security . . . ." The formulation of policies
pertaining to the alien's right to remain here are entrusted exclusively to Con-
gress, and in the enforcement of these policies the Executive Branch must re-
spect the safeguards of due process . . . .Policy questions concerning the ap-
propriate punishment to be applied for the commission of unreasonable searches
and seizures do not come within the safeguards of the due process clause. Thus,
these matters should be left to the political branches of government.
Lopez-Mendoza, 705 F.2d at 1094-95 (quoting Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530
(1954)).
100. In my view, a sufficient reason for excluding from civil deportation proceed-
ings evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is that there is no other
way to achieve "the twin goals of enabling the judiciary to avoid the taint of partnership
in official lawlessness and of assuring the people - all potential victims of unlawful
government conduct - that the government would not profit from its lawless behavior,
thus minimizing the risk of seriously undermining popular trust in government."
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Lopez-Mendoza and re-
iterated its characterization of deportation proceedings as civil in na-
ture and determinative of an individual's right to remain in the
United States. The Court found that Lopez entered no objection to
the evidence introduced against him. Furthermore, even had the ar-
rest been illegal, it was irrelevant to the deportation proceedings.
The Court, in applying the Janis formulation, found the deterrent
value of the exclusionary rule in deportation proceedings minimal
and the social costs great.
The Court ruled that the INS could meet its burden by relying on
evidence independently obtained or sufficiently attenuated from the
original arrest. In addition, few arrestees would challenge the legal-
ity of the arrest. Furthermore, the INS had internal mechanisms to
deter Fourth Amendment violations by its agents. The Court found
other available remedies sufficient.
The majority discussed the practical problems encountered by the
INS and emphasized the great weight to be afforded this element in
the Janis calculation. The Court expressed its concern in terms
closely tailored to the language of the Ninth Circuit dissent. Justices
O'Connor, with whom Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist
concurred, conceded a possible contrary ruling should Fourth
Amendment violations by the INS become widespread.
Justice White filed a strong dissent in Lopez-Mendoza, with Jus-
tices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens agreeing in part. White viewed
the majority decision as premised on a faulty assessment of costs and
benefits. He found insufficient the alternative remedies suggested by
the majority; for example, an INS internal mechanism to deter vio-
lations and civil suits for damages. In particular, White criticized
several aspects of the majority opinion. First, he attacked the impli-
cation by the majority that attorneys and judges are significantly less
familiar with the intricacies of the Fourth Amendment than are INS
officers. Second, White took exception to the majority conclusion
that the application of the rule would interefere with hearings and
result in minimal deterrence of violations. Finally, Justice White
noted that the exclusionary rule had previously applied to deporta-
tion proceedings and that no evidence existed to indicate that the
rule interferred with INS operations.
Justice Brennan, in a separate dissenting opinion, disagreed with
the argument that the deterrent effect provided the only justification
for the rule. Justice Marshall, also writing a separate dissent, reiter-
ated the obligation of the judiciary to avoid participation in unlawful
Id. at 1067 n. I1 (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 357 (1974) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting)).
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conduct.' 0 '
The Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit based their decisions in
Lopez-Mendoza on the premise that deterrence was the sole purpose
for the exclusionary rule. This is contrary to the various purposes for
which the rule was originally intended.10 2 The Supreme Court deci-
sion allocates greater control to the federal government enforcement
functions at the expense of individual rights. 0 3 This in turn opens
the door to possible greater abuse of that discretion, and diminishes
the possibility of its correction. An alien deported as a result of reli-
ance on illegally obtained data is unable to pursue either a civil suit
against the offending officer or file a complaint against him with the
INS. The trend by the Supreme Court to allocate greater authority
to the federal government is visible in other areas of immigration
law.
SUSPENSION OF DEPORTATION
The Immigration and Nationality Act authorizes the suspension of
an alien's deportation 0 4 within the context of deportation proceed-
101. Although one would gain little inkling of this from recent Supreme Court
opinions, the primary goals of the framers of the exclusionary rule were to avoid "sanc-
tioning" or "ratifying" unconstitutional police conduct; to preserve the judicial process
from contamination; and to prevent the Government from profiting from its own wrong-
doing. The framers of the exclusionary rule may have expected, or at least hoped, to
affect police behavior, but there is no suggestion in any of the early cases that the rule's
survival was to depend on proof that it deters police misconduct.
B. Kamisar, quoted in N.Y. Times, July 11, 1984, at A25.
102. "Of late the Court has acquired a voracious appetite for judicial activism in
its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, at least when it comes to restricting the constitu-
tional rights of the citizen." New Jersey v. T.L.O., 104 S. Ct. 3583 (1984) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
103. For examples of such abuse see Benitez-Mendoza v. INS, 707 F.2d 1107 (9th
Cir. 1983), modified at 748 F.2d 539 (1984); In re Castaneda (A23447807)(BIA 1984).
See also U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS: THE TARNISHED GOLDEN DOOR (Sept. 1980).
Aliens must increasingly rely upon the protections of the Fifth Amendment to avoid the
consequence of the non-applicability of the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., In re Cas-
taneda (A23447807) (BIA 1984).
104. Section 244 of the I.N.A., 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (1982) currently provides:
(a) As hereinafter prescribed in this section, the Attorney General may, in his
discretion, suspend deportation and adjust the status to that of an alien law-
fully admitted for permanent residence, in the case of an alien (other than an
alien described in section 1251(a)(19) of this title) who applies to the Attorney
General for suspension of deportation and -
(1) is deportable under any law of the United States except the provisions spec-
ified in paragraph (2) of this subsection; has been physically present in the
United States for a continuous period of not less than seven years immediately
preceding the date of such application, and proves that during all of such pe-
riod he was and is a person of good moral character; and is a person whose
1041
ings,'0 5 when that alien can establish: (1) that he has been physically
present in the United States for a continuous period of not less than
seven years immediately preceding the date of application; (2) that
he has been and continues to be a person of good moral character;
and (3) that the deportation would result in extreme hardship to the
alien or to the alien's spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen or
permanent resident of the United States. Additionally, the Attorney
General or his delegate must be convinced that that individual mer-
its a favorable exercise of discretion. The Ninth Circuit and the Su-
preme Court have recently clashed in their construction of the re-
quirement of "continuous physical presence" and the function of a
court reviewing an administrative determination regarding the exis-
tence of extreme hardship. 106
"Continuous Physical Presence". The History of the Provision
and Prior Judicial Interpretation
Congress did not incorporate a residence requirement into the sus-
pension of deportation provision until 1948. At that time, it amended
the immigration laws to authorize suspension of deportation for
those aliens who had "resided continuously in the United States for
seven years or more" and could demonstrate good moral character
during the years preceding the application for such relief.107 Con-
cerned with instances of substantial abuse, 0 8 Congress ultimately re-
deportation would, in the opinion of the Attorney General, result in extreme
hardship to the alien or to his spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the
United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence ....
105. The Supreme Court has characterized deportation as "a drastic measure and
at times the equivalent of banishment or exile .... Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S.
6, 10 (1948). The deportation of an individual may separate him from his home and
family and deprive him "of all that makes life worth living." Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259
U.S. 276, 284 (1922). See also Gastelum-Quinones v. Kennedy, 374 U.S. 469, 479
(1963) ("deportation is a drastic sanction, one which can destroy lives and disrupt
families").
There are 19 substantive grounds for the deportation of aliens. INA § 241(a)(1)-(19),
8 U.S.C. §§ 1251(a)(I)-(19)(1982). The procedural mechanism for deportation is out-
lined in sections 242 and 243 of the I.N.A., 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252, 1253 (1982).
An application to suspend deportation may also arise within the context of a motion to
reopen. If circumstances change following the deportation proceeding, the alien may
move to reopen the proceeding to apply for this remedy. 8 C.F.R. § 242.22 (1984).
Where the alien has appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals from an order of
deportation and the Board has rendered a decision, the alien must direct the motion to
reopen to the Board, rather than to the Immigration Judge. 8 C.F.R. § 3.2 (1984).
106. INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139 (1981). Other articles have examined
this case extensively; their analysis will not be repeated here. See Loue, What Went
Wrong With Wang?: An Examination of INS v. Wang, 20 SAN DIaGO L. REv. 59
(1982); Feldman, Scope of Judicial Review: Extreme Hardship and the Whipsaw of
Illegal Aliens, 36 AD. L. REv. 27 (1984).
107. 62 Stat. 1206.
108. E.g., where an alien "has a total of 7 years residence in the United States
[but] the alien has been out of the United States for as long as 2 years during the last 7
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placed the seven years "continuous residence" requirement with the
requirement of seven years "continuous physical presence." 10 9 No di-
rect statement exists which indicates that Congress, in enacting the
1952 Act, intended the term "continuous" to be interpreted literally.
Congress in 1962 drastically amended section 244 of the Act, but
left intact the requirement of seven years continuous physical pres-
ence.110 Prior to the 1962 amendment, only one court of appeals had
interpreted the continuous physical presence requirement. This court
held that the term should be construed flexibly. 1 The INS pur-
ported to interpret the provision literally, but in at least one case,
failed to do S0.112 Congress presumably knew of these prior interpre-
tations at the time that it adopted the new law.113
In Rosenberg v. Fleuti,114 subsequent to the adoption of the 1962
amendments, the Supreme Court construed the term "entry" within
the meaning of section 101(a) (13) of the Immigration and National-
years." S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 602 (1950). See also S. REP. No. 1137,
82d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, 25 (1952); H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 31
(1952).
109. H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1952).
110. 2 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 7.9a
(1977).
111. The respondent was initially denied suspension of deportation for failure to
meet the continuous physical presence requirement. On review in McLeod v. Peterson,
283 F.2d 180 (3d Cir. 1960), the court of appeals found that the respondent's failure to
fulfill this requirement resulted from reliance upon the statements of INS agents. INS, in
effect, argued that reliance upon that error deprived respondent of the suspension rem-
edy. The court vehemently opposed such an interpretation of the law:
To yield to this argument would be to become a party to a "bootstrap" opera-
tion by means of which officers of the United States seek to turn their own
error, however innocent, into the bar to the assertion of a right by the victim of
this very error. We cannot hold that this is what the statute demands.
Id. at 187. The court refused to determine the length of absence which would negate a
finding of continuous physical presence: "While it is true that the statutory language
does not admit of flexibility in this matter, on its face, it seems clear that circumstances
can be suggested where an absence of even several years would not prevent an alien from
being continuously physically present." Id. at 186.
112. In re J.M.D., 7 I. & N. Dec. 105 (BIA 1956). The INS stated that "a statute
should be construed so as to carry out the intent of the legislature, although such con-
struction may seem contrary to the letter of the statute." Id. at 107.
113. See Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353,
382 n.66 (1982); Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580-81 (1978).
114. 374 U.S. 449 (1963).
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict between the Second and
Ninth Circuits. The court in DiPasquale v. Karnuth, 158 F.2d 878 (2d Cir. 1947), de-
clined to find an "entry" where an alien passed through Canada while asleep on a night
train en route from Buffalo to Detroit. The Ninth Circuit in DelGuercio v. Delgadillo,
159 F.2d 130 (9th Cir. 1947), found an "entry" where an alien entered the United States
following a one week recovery in Cuba resulting from the torpedoing of his boat.
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ity Act. 15 The case involved a Swiss national who held permanent
residence status in the United States. Upon his attempt to enter the
United States following a short trip of several hours' duration to
Mexico, Fleuti faced excludability charges. 116 The Supreme Court,
however, found that an exclusion here would be inconsistent with
congressional intent.1 1 7 The Court cautioned that an alien could im-
peril his status by interrupting his residence either frequently or for
extended periods of time.118 However, the test for determining
whether an entry constituted an "entry" for immigration purposes
depended upon whether the alien's intent to depart was meaningfully
interruptive of the alien's permanent residence. The Court enumer-
ated three factors to be considered in making such determinations:
(1) the length of time the alien was gone; (2) the purpose of the
departure; and (3) the need to procure travel documents. Other fac-
tors, however, could be considered relevant.11 9
Later cases which construed the physical presence requirement of
section 244(a)(1) routinely applied the Fleuti construction of "en-
try," even though the Fleuti Court had construed only section
101(a)(13). The Ninth Circuit, in Wadman v. INS, found the dis-
tinction between "entry" and "continuous physical presence" "not
significant."1 20 The court ruled that this liberal construction would
affect the ameliorative purposes of the statute and would "tend to
increase the scope of the Attorney General's review and thus his
power to act in amelioration of hardship." 2 The Ninth Circuit con-
tinued to consistently apply the Fleuti rationale to section 244(a)(1)
115. 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(13) (1982). Justice Clark, joined by Justices Harlan,
Stewart, and White, argued vigorously that the majority had engaged in statutory con-
struction rather than construing the meaning of the term "entry." Fleuti, 374 U.S. at
463-67. For one writer's disapproval of the majority result and support for Clark's view,
see Note, Deportation: Procedural Rights of Reentering Permanent Resident Aliens
Subject to Exclusion Hearings, 51 FORDHAM L. REv. 1339, 1350 (1983).
116. INA § 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1982) enumerates the substantive grounds of
excludability.
117. Fleuti, 374 U.S. at 461-62. The Court found that Congress, in enacting sec-
tion 101(a)(13), intended to ameliorate harsh results suffered by permanent resident
aliens. The Court premised its conclusion upon naturalization provisions in the 1952 Act
which provided that an absence of less than six months duration would not presumptively
interrupt continuous residence. INA § 316, 66 Stat. 242-43, 8 U.S.C. § 1427 (1982),
construed in Fleuti, 374 U.S. at 458-59.
118. Fleuti, 374 U.S. at 461.
119. "[T]he operation of these and other possibly relevant factors remains to be
developed 'by the gradual process of judicial inclusion and exclusion'...." Id. at 462
quoting Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 104 (1871).
120. Wadman v. INS, 329 F.2d 812, 815 (9th Cir. 1964). "The question is
whether the interruption, viewed in balance with its consequences, can be said to hdve
been a significant one under the guides laid down in Fleuti. . . . The answer cannot be
found as a matter of law." Id. at 816.
121. Id, at 817. Compare with INS v. Jong Ja Wang, 450 U.S. 139 (1981) (liberal
construction of "extreme hardship" by reviewing court so as to effectuate ameliorative
purpose improperly limits Attorney General's discretion).
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cases.
1 22
The Second Circuit had occasion to construe the physical presence
requirement of section 244(a)(1) in Heitland v. INS.123 Although
conceding that Fleuti "supports a liberal rather than a niggardly
construction of the phrase 'continuous period' as used in §
244(a)(1),"1 124 the court found, nevertheless, that the couple's six-
week departure to Germany was meaningfully interruptive of their
presence here. The court noted that while Fleuti was a permanent
resident, the Heitlands were in the United States in violation of their
status, with no reasonable basis for believing they would be allowed
to remain. 125 Further, the Heitlands were able to effect a return to
the United States following that departure solely by engaging in
"implicit misrepresentations."
1 2
122. E.g., Mamanee v. INS, 566 F.2d 1103 (9th Cir. 1977); Yuen Sang Law v.
Attorney General of the United States, 479 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1039 (1973); Barragan-Sanchez v. Rosenberg, 471 F.2d 758 (9th Cir. 1972); Toon-
Ming Wong v. INS, 363 F.2d 234 (9th Cir. 1966); Git Foo Wong v. INS, 358 F.2d 151
(9th Cir. 1966). The court in Toon-Ming Wong explained the Fleuti criteria:
The length of the absence is relevant, but not alone determinative. Two ab-
sences aggregating sixteen months caused by the wrongful act of the Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service, have been held insufficient to break a five-year
"continuous presence" [McCleod v. Peterson, 283 F.2d 180 (3rd Cir. 1960)]
.... On the other hand, a very brief absence might suffice if voluntary and
accompanied by a realization of possible consequences to the alien's status as a
United States resident, particularly if the journey abroad were motivated by a
purpose inconsistent with the policies of the Act.
Toon-Ming Wong, 363 F.2d at 236.
123. 551 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 819 (1977).
124. Id. at 501.
The statute surely was not designed to protect the wanderers or the rootless.
Hence Congress used the word "continuous." On the other hand, to deny a
person the benefits of seven years' continuous residence because of one or two
short interruptions might well defeat the purpose of § 244(a)(1), since the
hardship in such a case would not be substantially different from that where
the presence has been uninterrupted.
Id.
125. Id. at 502.
126. To permit them to treat their six-week absence and re-entry as if these events
had never occurred would be to reward them for what amounted to misleading conduct
and would render meaningless the express requirement that the seven-year residence be
"continuous." The implicitly fraudulent circumstances of their return, when considered
with the admitted illegality of their presence in the United States before their departure
and the substantial period of time for which they absented themselves, do not present a
picture of the type of hardship or injustice which Fleuti or its progeny were intended to
remedy.
Id. at 503. The court here appears to collapse into one requirement the three separate
and distinct requirements of physical presence, good moral character, and extreme hard-
ship. The court also premised its decision on the aliens' illegal presence in the United
States. The statute, however, makes no distinction between those individuals who are
1045
The Ninth Circuit, in Kamheangpatiyooth v. INS,27 found the
Fleuti factors merely evidentiary and not themselves the object of
inquiry.128 The court introduced into the calculation two additional
factors: (1) whether the hardship would be as severe if the absence
had not occurred; and (2) whether there would be an increase in the
risk of deportation as a result of the absence. 29 The court found that
Congress had replaced the "continuous residence" requirement with
the "continuous physical presence" requirement only to appease field
officers. If any time period by itself were to bar relief, it would be a
period of two years based upon the complaints of those field of-
ficers.130 The court explained its construction of the statute by noting
that an alien who departed briefly during the seven years could real-
istically be in a situation comparable to an alien who has not de-
parted at all,' 3' and that congressional attention was actually di-
rected to the individual's degree of commitment to this society.'
32
Although the Ninth Circuit subsequently reaffirmed this new formu-
lation,'133 several other circuits vigorously rejected it.
The Fourth Circuit, in McColvin v. INS, ruled that the Ninth Cir-
cuit in Kamheangpatiyooth gave a broader interpretation to "contin-
legally present and those who have entered and/or remained without authorization.
127. 597 F.2d 1253 (1979).
128. The particular facts focused upon by the immigration judge - the time peti-
tioner was away, the distance he traveled, and the three documents petitioner obtained
before or during the trip - should not, alone or in the aggregate, bar the Attorney
General from considering the merits of petitioner's application for suspension of deporta-
tion. An absence of six or even 16 months does not interrupt the requisite continuity of
physical presence as a matter of law .... Nor does travel to any specific point, no
matter how distant break continuity conclusively.
Id. at 1258. The court interpreted congressional concern of abuse as barring relief to
those who had remained outside of the United States for two of the requisite seven years.
Id. at n.6 (construing S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 602 (1950)).
129. An absence cannot be significant or meaningfully interruptive of the
whole period if indications are that the hardship of deportation to the alien
would be equally severe had the absence not occurred, and that no significant
increase in the likelihood of deportation could reasonably have been expected to
flow from the manner and circumstances surrounding the absence.
Id. at 1257.
130. Id. at 1258 n.6 (quoting S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., Sess. 602 (1950)).
131. Id. at 1256-57.
132. The court reflected that:
It was Congress' judgment that presence of that length was likely to give rise
to a sufficient commitment to this society through establishment of roots and
development of plans and expectations for the future to justify an examination
by the Attorney General of the circumstances of the particular case to deter-
mine whether deportation would be unduly harsh . . . .Presence that is only
intermittent suggests the alien has not become so attached to this country that
the authorities should consider suspending normal operation of the immigration
laws on his behalf.
Id. at 1256.
133. de Gallardo v. INS, 624 F.2d 85 (9th Cir. 1980); Chan v. INS, 610 F.2d 651
(9th Cir. 1979).
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uous" than intended by Fleuti or by Congress.134 The court found
that retention by Congress of the "continuous physical presence" re-
quirement despite other changes to the suspension provision evi-
denced congressional intent that the requirement be strictly
applied. 35
The application of the "continuous physical presence" requirement
first confronted the Eleventh Circuit in Fidalgo-Velez v. INS. 36 The
court ruled that the "broad and liberal" interpretation of the Ninth
Circuit in Kamheangpatiyooth contravened the plain language and
the legislative history of the statute. Furthermore, the Kamheangpa-
tiyooth test exceeded even the flexible standards of Fleuti. The court
ultimately concluded that the statute allowed no exceptions and was
to be strictly applied. 3 7 The Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed its position
in Marti-Xiques v. INS. 38
Phinpathya v. INS
Phinpathya v. INS3 9 involved the departure of a student for three
months to Thailand. Both the Immigration Judge and the Board of
Immigration Appeals found that, even under the Kamheangpa-
tiyooth standard, the trip was "meaningfully interruptive." The BIA
also noted that the trip necessitated a new passport and that respon-
dent was in the United States illegally at the time she left for Thai-
land. Further, the respondent was able to return to the United States
only by misrepresenting her status as the wife of a foreign student.
The Ninth Circuit reversed on the grounds that the BIA had mis-
applied the test. 40 The proper application required that the Board
134. McColvin v. INS, 648 F.2d 935 (1981).
135. Id. at 938. The court relied on various congressional reports, supra note 108,.
and emphasized Congress' intent to exclude:
aliens [who] are deliberately flouting our immigration laws by the processes of
gaining admission into the United States illegally or ostensibly as nonimmi-
grants but with the intention of establishing themselves in a situation in which
they may subsequently have access to some administrative remedy to adjust
their status to that of permanent residents.
McColvin, 648 F.2d at 938 (quoting S. REP. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, 25
(1952)).
136. 697 F.2d 1026 (11th Cir. 1983).
137. Id. at 1029.
138. 713 F.2d 1511, 1514 n.3 (1lth Cir. 1983), vacated, 724 F.2d 1463 (11th Cir.
1984), aff'd, 741 F.2d 350 (lth Cir. 1984).
139. 673 F.2d 1013 (9th Cir. 1981) rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 584 (1984).
140. The court found that the Board had adopted the position that an absence
would necessarily be "meaningfully interruptive" if either of the factors enunciated by
Kamheangpatiyooth were absent. Id. at 1018.
1047
"view the circumstances in their totality, and analyze those circum-
stances in light of the congressional purpose underlying the con-
tinuity requirement. ' 141 The court reiterated the Kamheangpa-
tiyooth view of the congressional purpose.
142
The Supreme Court vehemently rejected the Ninth Circuit ap-
proach to the "continuous physical presence" requirement. 143 The
Court reviewed the same legislative documents and found that
"[h]ad Congress been concerned only with 'non-intermittent' pres-
ence or with the mere maintenance of a domicile or general abode, it
could have retained the 'continuous residence' requirement. 1' 44 It
noted further that Congress had provided moderating provisions in
other portions of the Immigration and Nationality Act where it had
desired flexibility in administering the law. 45 The Court found the
ameliorative intent of the 1962 amendments relevant only to the ex-
treme hardship requirement.' 4" The Court suggested that the
Kamheangpatiyooth formulation would merge the extreme hardship
requirement with the separate and distinct requirement of continu-
ous physical presence, and read the latter out of the Act entirely.
147
The Supreme Court eliminated the degree of flexibility available
under the Fleuti doctrine. The Court found Fleuti "essentially irrele-
vant" to suspension applications. It characterized Fleuti as dealing
with a statutory exception enacted to ameliorate the harsh effects of
prior judicial construction of the term "entry." Congress had added
the requirement of continuous physical presence to the statute as a
threshold requirement to limit the discretionary availability of the
suspension remedy. The Court further distinguished Fleuti by noting
that the case involved the departure of a lawful resident, whereas
Phinpathya addressed the status of an illegal resident who had no
basis for expecting permission to remain. 4 8
The respondent argued that the Act should be construed so as to
141. Id. at 1017.
142. Id.
143. INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183 (1984). The Ninth Circuit has since com-
mented that the Supreme Court changed the law from what the Ninth Circuit believed it
to be, Dasigan v. INS, 743 F.2d 628 (9th Cir. 1984).
144. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. at 191.
145. Id. See former section 301(b) of the I.N.A. Although this section required
two years of continuous physical presence for the maintenance of one's status as a United
States citizen or national, it provided that "absence from the United States of less than
sixty days in the aggregate during the period for which continuous physical presence in
the United States is required shall not break the continuity of such physical presence."
86 Stat. 1289 (repealing 71 Stat. 644 (12-month aggregate absence does not break con-
tinuity of physical presence)). Compare the Court's refusal to read moderation into the
application of the presence requirement of section 244(a)(1) with its willingness in Fleuti
to do so with respect to "entry."
146. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. at 191.
147. Id. at 195.
148. Id. at 192-194.
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broaden the discretion of the Attorney General. The Court found
that such an approach would shift authority from Congress to the
INS, and ultimately, to the courts. The Court found this scheme
"impermissible in our tripartite scheme of government."
149
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens, con-
curred in the judgment but voiced opposition to the reasoning of the
majority. They interpreted the legislative history as compelling a
flexible interpretation of the continuous physical presence require-
ment. In addition, the legislative history indicated intended excep-
tions to the language of the Act. 150 Finally, Brennan noted that the
INS had formerly applied the provision flexibly.151
Phinpathya-An Analysis
Both the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court purported to base
their holdings in Phinpathya entirely upon congressional intent as
reflected in the language of the legislation and its developmental his-
tory. Several circuits prior to the Phinpathya decision had indicated
that the statute allowed no flexibility. 52 Each court's philosophy of
its role and the location of authority may have as much to do with
the divergent holdings in Phinpathya, as did the views of legislative
intent.
The Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit both discussed congres-
sional concern regarding the abuses of the former "continuous resi-
dence" requirement. 53 Despite the lack of a direct statement indi-
cating that Congress intended to literally apply the "continuous
physical presence" requirement, the Supreme Court accepted con-
gressional statements of concern as conclusively establishing such an
intent. It did not, however, apply the statute in accordance with con-
gressional intent in comparing the factual situations of Fleuti and
149. Id. at 592.
150. It is a hornbook proposition that:
All laws should receive a sensible construction. General terms should be so
limited in their application as not to lead to injustice, oppression, or an absurd
consequence. It will always, therefore, be presumed that the legislature in-
tended exceptions to its language, which would avoid results of this character.
The reason for the law in such cases should prevail over its letter.
United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. 482, 486-87 (7 Wall. 1868).
151. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. at 185 n.1. The Government conceded at oral argument
that "the [INS] believes that there is room for flexibility in applying [§ 244]." Id. at
593.
152. E.g., Marti-Xiques v. INS, 713 F.2d 1511 (11th Cir. 1983); Fidalgo-Velez,
697 F.2d at 1026; McColvin, 648 F.2d at 935.
153. See supra notes 108 and 132 and accompanying text.
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Phinpathya. The fact of Phinpathya's illegal status in the United
States is irrelevant to the determination of the suspension application
since the statute attaches no significance to the legality of one's pres-
ence in the calculation of eligibility for suspension.5
The Supreme Court eliminated the Attorney General's discretion
in the application of this requirement. The practical effects of this
decision are twofold. First, it virtually eliminates judicial review of
suspension cases where the alien has been outside of the United
States for any period, however short, during the seven years preced-
ing the application for relief. Second, the decision all but forecloses
suspension as a remedy.
Ample evidence now exists supporting the Ninth Circuit's asser-
tion that Congress intended a flexible application of the continuous
physical presence requirement. The House of Representatives, in a
411 to 4 vote adopting the Roybal Amendment (number 35) to H.R.
1510,115 gave clear notice that it did not approve of the Supreme
Court's nullification of the suspension remedy. 5 The bill would re-
instate a "meaningful interruption" test,15 7 but did not specify
whether the Fleuti or the Kamheangpatiyooth criteria would apply.
Phinpathya and Wang: Siamese Twins?
The Supreme Court in Ins v. Jung Ha Wang, 58 echoing Wallace's
vigorous dissent in Villena v. INS,'" interpreted section 244(a)(1)
154. Justice Kaufman explained that such a distinction would result in discrimina-
tion unauthorized by statute. Heitland v. INS, 551 F.2d 495, 507, n.3 (2d Cir. 1977)
(Kaufman, J., dissenting).
155. 130 CONG. REC. H5808 (daily ed. June 14, 1984) (statement of Rep.
Roybal).
156. [Tlhe reason for that is to express the intent of Congress that the re-
quirement not be literally or strictly construed in light of the recent Supreme
Court opinion that did so. The practical result of the Supreme Court's opinion is
to nullify the suspension of deportation provision, a result that the Congress
could not have intended. The more personal result is that the long-time residents
of this country are being denied legal status unfairly on the grounds that they
may have only briefly made an innocent trip to outside the borders. This was not
the intent of Congress when the legislation was passed. The administration does
not agree with the Supreme Court, and what we are doing with this amendment
is simply clarifying the matter and making it quite clear that it is the intent of
Congress to make it possible for an individual to be able to physically leave the
country in a temporary way and that absence not be a meaningful interruption
of his continuous physical presence.
Id. It is questionable, however, whether the 98th Congress in 1984 can legitimately speak
to the intent of the 82d Congress in 1952.
157. The amendment would provide: "(2) An alien shall not be considered to have
failed to maintain continuous physical presence in the United States under paragraphs
(1) and (2) of subsection (a) if the absence from the United States did not meaningfully
interrupt the continuous physical presence." Id.
158. 450 U.S. 139 (1981).
159. 622 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1980).
If INS discretion is to mean anything, it must be that the INS has some lati-
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as delegating to the Attorney General the definition of "extreme
hardship," reviewable only for abuse of discretion. The decision ef-
fectively foreclosed judicial review of the substantive decision, and
left open only review of the process by which the Attorney General
reached a determination as to the existence of extreme hardship in
any given case. Wang thus shifted authority from the courts to the
Attorney General. 0
Phinpathya, too, foreclosed the possibility of judicial review of the
definition of "continuous physical presence." Phinpathya, though,
reached even further in its curtailment of discretion, by eliminating
that discretion which the courts had interpolated from the statute to
be within the province of the Attorney General.'
In two watershed decisions, the Supreme Court has thus removed
the judiciary as a major directive element in the application and for-
mulation of the law. These decisions adhere to Justice Clark's re-
monstrance that the courts in construing statutes should refrain from
tude in deciding when they reopen a case. The INS should have the right to be
restrictive. Granting such motions too freely will permit endless delay of depor-
tation by aliens creative and fertile enough to continuously produce new and
material facts sufficient to establish a prima facie case. It will also waste the
time and efforts of immigration judges called upon to preside at hearings auto-
matically required by the prima facie allegations. There can be no doubt that
the majority opinion eliminates the INS discretion anticipated by the regula-
tions creating the motion to reopen.
Id. at 1362-63.
160. Wang addressed an application for suspension of deportation filed in the con-
text of a motion to reopen. Courts have applied Wang to motions to reopen generally.
See, e.g. Anwazi v. INS, 751 F.2d 1120 (9th Cir. 1985) (application for adjustment of
status). The standard to be applied in ruling on a motion to reopen is not always clear,
though, and different panels of the same court of appeals may express conflicting views.
Compare with Mattis v. INS, 756 F.2d 748 (9th Cir. 1985) (application for suspension
of deportation). For the Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement on a motion to
reopen, premised upon an application for suspension of deportation, see INS v. Rios-
Pineda, 105 S. Ct. 2098 (1985), rev'g Rios Pineda v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, INS, 720
F.2d 529 (8th Cir. 1983). The Ninth Circuit has also recently addressed the standard
governing motions to reopen premised on applications for suspension. of deportation. See,
e.g., Saldana v. INS, 762 F.2d 824 (9th Cir. 1985).
161. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. at 195.
In INS v. Wang, we rejected a relaxed standard for evaluating the "extreme
hardship" requirement as impermissibly shifting discretionary authority from
INS to the courts.. . . Respondent's suggestion that we construe the Act to
broaden the Attorney General's discretion analogously would shift authority to
relax the "continuous physical presence" requirement from Congress to INS
and, eventually, as is evident from the experience in this case, to the courts.
We must therefore reject respondent's suggestion as impermissible in our tri-
partite scheme of government. Congress designs the immigration laws, and it is
up to Congress to temper the laws' rigidity if it so desires.
Id.
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constructing statutes."8 2 In the process, however, the Supreme Court
itself has engaged in legislating. By lessening the possibility of judi-
cial review, it has effectively eliminated a remedy which Congress
expressly formulated as a means of alleviating hardship. 63 The Su-
preme Court has refused to acknowledge, however, that such an ap-
proach may permit violations of an individual's due process rights,
even though the individual is illegally here.16 1 Such an approach ef-
fectively sidesteps the concerns voiced by both circuit courts 65 and
Congress.'66
DUE PROCESS FOR RETURNING RESIDENTS
The Immigration and Nationality Act provides for the exclusion
of aliens who are ineligible to receive visas. 6 7 These provisions also
apply to those who have obtained permanent resident status, later
leave the United States, and subsequently seek re-entry, only to find
that they have committed an offense or assumed a status which ren-
ders them excludable. Whether the alien will ultimately be found
162. Fleuti, 374 U.S. at 449, 463 (Clark, J., dissenting).
163. Although the conclusion is clear that some discretionary power exercised by
agencies is so far "committed" to agency discretion as to be unreviewable and some is
not, the problem of determining what action is so committed and what is not is often
subtle, elusive and unclear.
The most important problem about action committed to agency discretion by
law is the extent to which courts should refrain from entering highly special-
ized areas of administration for the purpose of determining whether discretion
has been abused. When administrators are specialists, when the subject matter
is within their specialization, when the factors that may have influenced their
discretionary determination are numerous and complex, and when the judges
as generalists have little confidence in their own capacity to provide a useful
check, the natural tendency of judges is to get rid of the challenge of the ad-
ministrators' discretion by reciting that the action is committed to agency dis-
cretion by law and that it is therefore unreviewable. Yet whenever a court so
holds, a party who thinks that discretion has been abused is denied a meaning-
ful judicial check.
K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES-TEXT-PROBLEMS 64-65 (6th ed. 1977).
164. For example, if the INS coerces an individual to sign a voluntary return
rather than processing him for a deportation proceeding, the alien arguably has been
denied due process. Yet, under Phinpathya, the individual's coerced departure is still
interruptive of the seven year continuous physical presence. Consequently, the possibility
of suspension of deportation is foreclosed.
165. See, e.g., Amezquita-Soto v. INS, 708 F.2d 898 (3d Cir. 1983) (Gibbons, J.,
dissenting); Antoine-Dorcelli v. INS, 703 F.2d 19 (1st Cir. 1983); Santana-Figueroa v.
INS, 644 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981); Tovar v. INS, 612 F.2d 794 (3d Cir. 1980).
The Supreme Court in the past has recognized that where the literal application of a
statute would lead to absurd results, the Court was obliged to abide by the legislative
policy rather than by the plain language of the legislation. See, e.g., United States v.
American Trucking Associations, Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940). The Supreme Court's
tenacity to the plain language of the physical presence requirement has produced an
absurd result - the nullification of that remedial provision.
166. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
167. INA § 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1982).
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excludable may turn on whether his departure was "meaningfully
interruptive."1681 The Supreme Court in Landon v. Plasencia,169 re-
versed a Ninth Circuit decision 17 0 holding that such a determination
could be made only within the context of deportation proceedings.
The Supreme Court held that exclusion proceedings were sufficient
in such circumstances. If the exclusion proceedigs determined that
the resident had not made an "entry,"' 7'1 such proceedings would be
terminated and the government could pursue its case solely within
the context of a deportation hearing. 7 2 This holding significantly
reduces the remedies available to returning residents, by streamlin-
ing governmental procedure for expulsion and minimizing the possi-
bility of judicial review.
Background
The distinction between an exclusion hearing and a deportation
hearing is significant. An exclusion hearing determines admissibility
while a deportation hearing determines whether an alien should be
expelled. In an exclusion hearing, the applicant for admission must
establish his admissibility. In deportation proceedings, the govern-
ment bears the burden. 17 3 While an alien in deportation proceedings
must receive a minimum of seven days notice of the charges against
him, 7 4 there is no notice requirement for those in exclusion proceed-
ings. 17 5 An alien who does not prevail in the context of a deportation
proceeding may appeal directly to a court of appeals. 76 An alien
may challenge an exclusion order only by petitioning for a writ of
habeas corpus.177 Further, various substantive remedies are available
to those in deportation proceedings which are denied to those in ex-
clusion proceedings, including voluntary departure, 78 suspension of
deportation,' 79 and the ability to designate the country of
168. See supra notes 115-19 and accompanying text.
169. Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982).
170. Plasencia v. Sureck, 637 F.2d 1286 (9th Cir. 1980).
171. For a discussion of "entry," see supra notes 114-19 and accompanying text.
172. Plasencia, 459 U.S. at 28.
173. See generally IA C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND
PROCEDURE §§ 3.18-3.23, 5.5-5.11 (1984).
174. 8 C.F.R. § 242.1(b)(1984).
175. See In re Salazar, 17 I. & N. Dec. 167, 169 (BIA 1969).
176. INA § 106(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a) (1982).
177. INA § 106(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(b) (1982).
178. INA § 244(e), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(e) (1982).
179. INA § 244(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1982).
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deportation.180
A permanent resident alien confronted with either event is actu-
ally confronting the possible loss of his permanent resident status.181
The Supreme Court, in Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 82 emphasized
that a temporary trip outside the United States does not terminate
the constitutional status of a permanent resident, nor deprive him of
his constitutional right to procedural due process. 8 3 Subsequently, in
Kwong Hal Chew v. Rogers,"" the court said flatly: "[I]f Chew is to
be deprived of his status . . . the Immigration and Naturalization
Service may do so only in proceedings in which the Service is moving
party, and bears the burden of proof . ,, ." These holdings
echoed to some degree the substance of a much earlier Ninth Circuit
decision.1 86 Later decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals re-
iterated the Chew v. Rogers holding.
18 7
Maldonado-Sandoval v. INS188 confronted the Ninth Circuit with
the question of which forum was appropriate for the determination
180. INA § 243(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a) (1982).
181. Permanent resident aliens may also lose their status through recission of
abandonment. INA § 246, 8 U.S.C. § 1256.
182. 344 U.S. 590 (1953).
183. Id. at 600-01. The Court stated:
While it may be that a resident alien's ultimate right to remain in the United
States is subject to alteration by statute or authorized regulation because of a
voyage undertaken by him to foreign ports, it does not follow that he is thereby
deprived of his constitutional right to procedural due process. His status as a
person within the meaning and protection of the Fifth Amendment cannot be
capriciously taken from him. Where neither Congress, the President, the Secre-
tary of State nor the Attorney General has inescapably said so, we are not
ready to assume that any of them has attempted to deprive such a person of a
fair hearing.
Id. at 601-02. See also Shaughnessy v. United States ex. rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 228
(1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
184. 257 F.2d 606 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
185. Id.
186. Carmichael v. Delaney, 170 F.2d 239 (9th Cir. 1948), involved a claim by a
returning resident facing exclusion to United States citizenship. In discussing the various
possible forums in which such a determination could be made, the court concluded that
"[T]he due process of law guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment would seem to require
that his substantially supported claim of citizenship be accorded a judicial trial." Id. at
244. The court further commented upon the fate of an individual actually excluded:
Throughout history banishment or exile has been looked upon as a penalty lit-
tle less dreadful than death. To one in appellee's situation exclusion is in sub-
stance and practical effect the equivalent of banishment. It involves the same
severance from home and existing ties that the individual suffers who is ex-
pelled from the country in a proceeding to deport. There is no difference in
their loss of freedom of movement or in the nature of the hardships they are
called upon to undergo. The sole distinction resides in the mere matter of no-
menclature. The distinction, we think, is of no moment insofar as concerns the
Constitutional guaranty of due process of law.
Id. at 245.
187. In re Salazar, 17 1. & N. Dec. 167 (BIA 1979); In re Kane, 15 I. & N. Dec.
258 (BIA 1975).
188. 518 F.2d 278 (9th Cir. 1975) (per curiam).
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of admissibility of a permanent resident. Respondent was a Mexican
citizen who obtained his permanent residence in 1967. At the time of
his marriage to a United States citizen, he was also married to a
Mexican citizen. Upon his return from a short trip to Mexico, re-
spondent was refused entry and found excludable in exclusion
proceedings.
The Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that a departure could not be
meaningfully interruptive if it appeared during exclusion proceedings
that the alien was a permanent resident seeking to return after a
brief visit. 189 In the event of such an occurrence, the INS could pro-
ceed only within the context of deportation proceedings since the re-
spondent was already a permanent resident and not an alien seeking
entry. By this ruling, the Court adopted the procedure outlined by
the Board of Immigration Appeals in several unpublished
decisions. 190
Landon v. Plasencia
Plasencia v. Sureck'9' again placed the issue of due process for
returning residents before the Ninth Circuit. Respondent was a citi-
zen of Mexico and a permanent resident of the United States. Upon
respondent's return from a trip to Mexico, she was charged with at-
tempting to smuggle six aliens into the United States. In exclusion
proceedings, the immigration judge, placing upon her the burden of
proving her admissibility, ultimately found her excludable. The dis-
trict court, upon entertaining a petition for writ of habeas corpus,
remanded the case to the INS to begin deportation proceedings.192
Relying upon the Kwong Hai Chew cases and its decision in Mal-
donado-Sandoval, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court deci-
sion to litigate the issue in deportation proceedings. The court distin-
guished respondent's situation from those cases in which the criminal
charges had been fully litigated prior to the exclusion proceeding.
These cases did not address the question of whether the departure
was meaningfully interruptive. 93
Judge Wallace registered a forceful dissent. He distinguished the
prior Ninth Circuit case of Palatian v. INS by noting that the stat-
ute under which Palatian was excluded required a conviction,
189. Id. at 280-81.
190. Id. at 281 n.6.
191. 637 F.2d 1286 (9th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 459 U.S. 21 (1982).
192. Id. at 1287.
193. See, e.g., Palatian v. INS, 502 F.2d 1091 (9th Cir. 1974).
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whereas Plasencia faced exclusion on grounds not requiring convic-
tion. Wallace also distinguished Maldonado-Sandoval as dealing
with a brief, innocent departure involving no criminal purpose.2
94
Additionally, Wallace relied upon the language of the legislation by
noting that while Congress had explicitly provided certain procedural
safeguards for those to be excluded for drug smuggling, it had not
done the same for those accused of alien smuggling. The former re-
quired a conviction and the latter did not. He concluded that the
court does "not have the right or power to interpolate procedural
requirements from one statute to another.'
1 95
In Landon v. Plasencia, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth
Circuit holding and followed the reasoning of Judge Wallace in bas-
ing its conclusion upon the legislative history of the exclusion provi-
sion.196 The Court found that Congress intended admissibility to be
determined only in the context of an exclusion hearing. 197 It inter-
preted the Kwong Hai Chew cases as requiring only due process; not
as establishing a right to identical treatment with those permanent
residents still within the United States.1 98 The Court balanced the
interest of Plasencia in retaining her resident status against the gov-
ernmental interest in the efficient administration of the immigration
laws. 19 In striking a balance in favor of the government, °0 the
Court limited the role of the judiciary to determining "what proce-
dures would satisfy the minimum requirements of due process on the
194. Maldonado-Sandoval, 637 F.2d at 1289-90.
195. Id. at 1291. Wallace also stated: "Even though the statutes provide for a
seemingly disparate treatment, 'Congress unquestionably has the power to exclude all
classes of undesirable aliens from this country, and the courts are charged with enforcing
such exclusion when Congress has directed it .... " Id. at 1291 (quoting Fleuti, 374
U.S. at 461).
196. Plasencia, 459 U.S. at 21.
197. The special inquiry officer is empowered to determine whether an alien
detained for further inquiry shall be excluded and deported or shall be allowed
to enter after he has given the alien a hearing. The procedure established in the
bill is made the sole and exclusive procedure for determining the admissibility of
a person to the United States.
S. REP. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1952); H. R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d
Sess. 56 (1952), reprinted in 1953 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1653, 1711.
198. Plasencia, 459 U.S. at 31. Cf. Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1976)
(distinction between two classes of permanent residents for relief under section 212(c)
unconstitutional).
199. [T]he courts must consider the interest at stake for the individual, the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of the interest through the procedures used as
well as the probable value of additional or different procedural safeguards, and
the interest of the government in using the current procedures rather than addi-
tional or different procedures.
Id. at 34 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976)).
200. "[I]t must weigh heavily in the balance that control over matters of immigra-
tion is a sovereign prerogative, largely within the control of the executive and the legisla-
ture." Plasencia, 459 U.S. at 34.
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reentry of a permanent resident alien." 201 The Court remanded for
further findings the issue of whether Plasencia herself had been ac-
corded due process.
202
Although both the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court agreed
that a returning resident was to be accorded due process, the courts
differed on what constituted the minimum requirements necessary.
Consistent with its reasoning in Plasencia, the Supreme Court con-
ceivably could find the almost nonexistent protections afforded one
during exclusion proceedings sufficient, providing the government
bore the burden of proof, pursuant to the Kwang Hai Chew holdings.
Judge Wallace's examination of the relevant case and statutory law
appears to support this construction. However, while admonishing
his colleagues to refrain from "interpolat[ing] procedural require-
ments from one statute to another," 20 3 Wallace did not explain why
Kwang Hai Chew's interpolation with respect to the burden of proof
is any more satisfactory than the wholesale interpolation of the safe-
guards afforded by the deportation process, or how minimal due pro-
cess is satisfied where a long-term permanent resident has fewer
rights in a hearing procedure than does a casual visitor facing expul-
sion. Thus, while seemingly antagonistic to judicial activism of a re-
medial nature, the Supreme Court has judicially constructed a hy-
brid third procedure for the determination of an alien's expulsion,
where no such procedure existed legislatively. The effect of this hy-
brid procedure closely resembles the effect of Supreme Court limita-
tions on judicial reviewability in the suspension context and Supreme
Court rulings in the search and seizure context: a reduction of reme-
dies available for the individual and a corresponding increase in the
speed and efficiency with which the agency can process an individual
for expulsion.
201. Id. at 35. The Court elaborated:
The role of the judiciary is limited to determining whether the procedures meet
the essential standard of fairness under the Due Process Clause and does not
extend to imposing procedures that merely displace congressional choices of
policy. Our previous discussion has shown that Congress did not intend to re-
quire the use of deportation procedures in cases such as this one. Thus, it
would be improper simply to impose deportation procedures here because the
reviewing court may find them preferable.
Id. at 34-35. For one writer's approval of these limitations, see Note, Immigration Law:
Process Due Resident Aliens Upon Entering the United States - Landon v. Plasencia,
103 S.Ct. 321 (1982), 24 HARV. INT'L L. J. 198, 204 (1983). Query whether the Court
would find such procedures sufficient where the entrant facing expulsion presents a color-
able claim to United States citizenship.
202. Plasencia, 459 U.S. at 37.
203. Plasencia, 637 F.2d at 1289-90.
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The Court has correspondingly limited the remedies available to
aliens who detrimentally rely upon government action or nonaction.
These holdings support INS facilitated expulsion process.
ESTOPPEL IN THE IMMIGRATION CONTEXT
Equitable Estoppel
INS v. Hibi204 confronted the Ninth Circuit with a claim for natu-
ralization benefits under the expired provisions of sections 701
through 705 of the Nationality Act of 1940. This legislation pro-
vided for the overseas naturalization of persons who (1) served hon-
orably in the military or naval forces of the United States; (2) were
not within the jurisdiction of any court authorized to naturalize
aliens; (3) met specific eligibility requirements relating to residence
and literacy; and (4) filed the petition under these sections prior to
December 31, 1946.205 Pursuant to these provisions, INS officers
204. 475 F.2d 7 (9th Cir. 1973).
205. Second War Powers Act of 1942, ch. 199, 56 Stat. 182, as amended.
Section 701 provided in pertinent part: [A]ny person not a citizen, regardless
of age, who has served or hereafter serves honorably in the military or naval
forces of the United States during the present war and [w]ho shall have been
at the time of his enlistment or induction a resident thereof and who (a) was
lawfully admitted into the United States, including its Territories and posses-
sions, or (b) having entered the United States, including its Territories and
possessions, prior to September 1, 1943, being unable to establish lawful admis-
sion into the United States serves honorably in such forces beyond the conti-
nental limits of the United States or has so served may be naturalized upon
compliance with all the requirements of the naturalization laws except that (I)
no declaration of intention, no certificate of arrival for those described in group
(b) hereof, and no period of residence within the United States or any State
shall be required; (2) the petition for naturalization may be filed in any court
having naturalization jurisdiction regardless of the residence of the petitioner;
(3) the petitioner shall not be required to speak the English language, sign his
petition in his own handwriting, or meet any educational test; . . Provided,
however, That . . . (3) the petition shall be filed not later than December 31,
1946 ....
Section 702 provided in pertinent part: During the present war, any person
entitled to naturalization under section 701 of this Act, who serving honorably
in the military . . forces of the United States is not within the jurisdiction of
any court authorized to naturalize aliens, may be naturalized in accordance
with all the applicable provisions of section 701 without appearing before a
naturalization court. The petition for naturalization of any petitioner under this
section shall be made and sworn to before and filed with, a representative of
the Immigration and Naturalization Service designated by the Commissioner
of a Deputy Commissioner, which designated representative is hereby author-
ized to receive such petition in behalf of the Service, to conduct hearings
thereon, to take testimony concerning any matter touching or in any way af-
fecting the admissibility of any such petitioner for naturalization, to call wit-
nesses, to administer oaths, including the oath of petitioner and his witnesses to
petition for naturalization and the oath of renunciation and allegiance pre-
scribed by section 335 of this Act, and to grant naturalization, and to issue
certificates of citizenship . ...
Section 705 provided in pertinent part: The Commissioner, with the approval
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traveled to overseas military posts to effect the naturalization of
those eligible under this legislation. In August 1945 the INS desig-
nated George Ennis, Vice Consul of the United States in Manila, to
naturalize aliens pursuant to section 702.
The State Department, just prior to the independence of the Phil-
ippines, received a communication from that government expressing
concern over the naturalization of Filipihios who had always lived in
the Philippines. The Commissioner of INS subsequently requested
that the Attorney General revoke Ennis' authority to naturalize
aliens and refrain from naming a new naturalization officer. The At-
torney General accordingly revoked Ennis' authority on September
26, 1945, and Ennis received notice of that revocation in October
1945. Another naturalization officer was not appointed until August
1946. The Act expired by its terms on December 31, 1946. Thus,
Filipinos eligible to naturalize under these provisions were unable to
do so for approximately nine months during the effective period of
the provisions.
20 6
The Ninth Circuit reasoned in Hibi that section 705 had imposed
upon the Commissioner of INS a legal duty to make available to all
qualified applicants the benefits of sections 701 and 702. Further, the
INS had failed in its duty to effectuate the purpose of section 702
and had prejudiced the applicant by its failure to notify him. The
court held the agency estopped from denying the naturalization ben-
efits of these provisions to petitioner, even though the effectiveness
period of the Act had long since expired.20 7 The Supreme Court re-
versed, finding that the failure to publicize respondent's rights under
the statute and the failure to have an authorized naturalization ex-
aminer stationed in the Philippines during the effective period of the
of the Attorney General, shall prescribe and furnish such forms, and shall
make such rules and regulations, as may be necessary to carry into effect the
provisions of this Act.
206. In re Naturalization of 68 Filipino War Veterans, 406 F. Supp. 931, 935-36
(N.D. Ca. 1975). The court did not address the government's liability for the absence of
a naturalization examiner during the period between the return of the United States
forces to the Philippines in October 1944 and the first appointment of a naturalization
examiner to the Philippines in August 1945. See ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 1009
(1975).
207. Hibi, 475 F.2d at 10-11. Four elements must exist to establish estoppel:
(1) The party to be estopped must know the facts; (2) he must intend that his
conduct shall be acted on or must so act that the party asserting the estoppel
has a right to believe it is so intended; (3) the latter must be ignorant of the
three facts; and (4) he must rely on the former's conduct to his injury. United
States v. Georgia Pacific Co., 421 F.2d 92, 96 (9th Cir. 1970).
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legislation, did not give rise to estoppel against the government. 0 8
The Court found that, unlike the usual estoppel claim premised upon
the action of a minor official, a major policy decision was at issue. In
balancing the equities in favor of the government, the Court placed
particular emphasis upon the sovereign nature of the immigration
function. It did not, however, expressly disapprove of the invocation
of estoppel against the federal government. In dissent, Douglas
sharply criticized the majority for disregarding the successful and
deliberate efforts of the executive branch in 1945 to frustrate the
congressional purpose. Douglas further criticized majority denial of
substantive rights to Filipinos by judicial fiat.2 °9
Several courts subsequent to Hibi found sufficient cause to estop
the Immigration and Naturalization Service. The respondent in
Corniel-Rodriguez v. INS entered the United States as the holder of
a second preference visa.210 Prior to entering, the United States con-
sul in Santo Domingo failed to advise respondent in accordance with
Department of State regulations that her second preference visa
classification would no longer apply if she married prior to entry into
the United States. 211 Respondent married her childhood sweetheart
before coming to the United States. The court, in precluding depor-
tation, found the alien naive and poorly educated and speculated
that the failure to comply would have been avoided if the consul had
given the mandatory warning. While limiting its holding to the "ex-
traordinary circumstances" of the case,212 the Second Circuit held
that "the basic notions of fairness must preclude the Government
from taking advantage of the consul's dereliction, and that a con-
208. INS v. Hibi, 414 U.S. 5, 9 (1973).
Compare Hibi with In re Vacontios Petition, 155 F. Supp. 427 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
There, the alien timely filed an application to petition for naturalization pursuant to sec-
tion 330(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. The applicable provision was due to
expire on December 23, 1953. The petitioner failed to file timely the actual petition as
the result of an INS delay in responding to a communication. The court found that the
filing of the application was the only affirmative step that petitioner could have taken. Id.
at 430. The court held: "When one takes all necessary affirmative steps to comply with
the literal requirements of a statute and is prevented from complying fully by the failure
of an administrative agency to take the steps necessary to permit his compliance he will
not be barred from assertinghis rights under that statute." Id. at 433. But see Montana
v. Kennedy, 366 U.S. 308 (1961), aft'g Montana v. Rogers, 278 F.2d 68 (7th Cir. 1960)
(misconduct of consular official insufficient to estop United States from denying citizen-
ship). The Montana Court did venture that "there may be circumstances in which the
United States is estopped to deny citizenship because of the conduct of its officials." Id.
at 315.
209. Hibi, 414 U.S. at 11.
210. 532 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1976).
211. The regulation provided: "The consular officer shall warn an alien [issued a
visa as a child], when appropriate, that he will be inadmissible as such an immigrant if
he is not unmarried at the time of application for admission." 22 C.F.R. § 42.122(d)
(1960).
212. Corniel-Rodriguez, 532 F.2d at 307.
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trary result would work a serious and manifest injustice.
213
Somewhat similar situations confronted the Ninth Circuit in San-
tiago v. INS.214 In this case involving separate incidents, respondents
entered the United States as either the child or spouse of a perma-
nent resident alien. Respondents, holders of second preference visas,
entered before the principal visa holder. Subsequently, the principal
visa holder either died or had their visa expire prior to their own
entry.215 In contesting deportability, the respondents claimed that
the INS should be estopped based on any combination of four
grounds: (1) the failure of the consular official to inform them of the
applicable statutory provision; (2) the failure of the INS officer at
the port of entry to advise them of the statutory provision; (3) the
failure of the INS officer at the port of entry to inquire as to the
whereabouts of the principal alien; and (4) the failure of the INS
officer at the port of entry to deny entry upon learning of the where-
abouts of the principal alien. The court, weighing the governmental
failure to inform against the standards enunciated in Hibi, found no
affirmative misconduct to justify the application of estoppel. The
court ruled that the respondents failed to establish a duty on the part
of the officers. This differed from Hibi where officials had acted con-
trary to directive. Further, the court noted that respondents had lost
no rights since they were not entitled to admission.216
Judge Choy registered his disagreement with majority balancing
of the equities. He found that the injustice resulting from failure of
the INS officer to exercise minimal care outweighed any harm to
public policy, particularly since this situation did not involve, as Hibi
did, the nullification of an entire policy.
217
The Ninth Circuit did find, however, affirmative misconduct justi-
213. Id. at 302.
214. 526 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1975). For another case involving similar claims of
reliance upon consular official's conduct, see Perwolf v. INS, 741 F.2d 1109 (8th Cir.
1984).
215. A spouse or child as defined in section 101(b)(1)(A), (B), (C), (D), or
(E) [8 U.S.C. § 1101 (b)(1)(A), (B), (C), (D), or (E)] shall, if not otherwise
entitled to an immigrant status and the immediate issuance of a visa or to condi-
tional entry under paragraphs (1) through (7), be entitled to the same status,
and the same order of consideration provided in subsection (b), if accompany-
ing, or following to join, his spouse or parent.
INA § 203(a)(8), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(9) (1982).
216. Santiago, 526 F.2d at 493. The court intimated that a finding of "affirmative
misconduct" might depend on the distinction between government misfeasance, justifying
the application of estoppel, and government nonfeasance, insufficient for the invocation of
that remedy. Id.
217. Id. at 494-96.
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fying estoppel in Sun IL Yoo v. INS.218 During a one year delay by
INS in adjudicating an application, the applicable Department of
Labor regulations changed, resulting in the respondent becoming in-
eligible for the preference classification.21 9 The court distinguished
this case from Santiago by noting an absolute right to the labor cer-
tification under the previously existing regulation. The court also dis-
tinguished this case from Hibi by noting that while Hibi could have
done more to ascertain his rights, the respondent here did everything
he could to legalize his status. Consequently, he should not be left to
sustain an unconscionable injury. 20 Judge Wright, in dissent, argued
that the INS should not be estopped from denying respondent's ap-
plication. Wright noted that this case paralleled Hibi in that Hibi
had an analogous absolute right to naturalize. Yet, unlike here, this
right in Hibi was insufficient to support estoppel.221
The Fifth Circuit, in reliance on both Hibi and Santiago, found
estoppel appropriate in Jung Been Suh v. INS. 2 2 This case involved
a deportation proceeding by the INS against an alien based on the
alien mistakenly filling out the wrong forms. The alien could have
filed the correct applications, but relied instead upon the INS wrong-
ful acceptance and retention of another application. The court ex-
pressed its displeasure with the INS violation of its own regulations
and refused to allow such noncompliance by the agency to result in
the deportation of the alien.223
The Ninth Circuit again addressed the issue of delay as a basis for
estoppel in Miranda v. INS.224 The respondent originally entered the
United States as a visitor and later married an American citizen.
The INS failed to act during an eighteen month period on petition of
the wife of the respondent. She ultimately withdrew the petition and
the INS denied respondent's application for adjustment of status.
The court found that the unexplained failure of the agency to adju-
dicate the petition in the eighteen month period prior to marital dis-
218. 534 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1976).
219 An alien whose occupation is currently listed in Schedule C-Precertification List
will be considered as having obtained a certification under Section 212(a)(14) [8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(14)] of the Act upon determination by the district director that the alien is
qualified for and will be engaged in such occupation and that the alien will not reside in
an area excluded from precertification by the Secretary of Labor.
8 C.F.R. § 204.1(d)(2) (1970).
220. "When such serious injury may be caused by INS decisions, its officials must
be held to the highest standards in the diligent performance of their duties." Sun IL Yoo,
534 F.2d at 1329. The court continued, "[A] person might sustain such a profound and
unconscionable injury in reliance on [an official's] action as to require, in accordance
with any sense of justice and fair play, that [he] not be allowed to inflict the injury." Id.
at 1329 (quoting Schuster v. CIR, 312 F.2d 311, 317 (9th Cir. 1962)).
221. Sun IL Yoo, 534 F.2d at 1330.
222. 592 F.2d 230 (5th Cir. 1979).
223. Id. at 231-32.
224. 638 F.2d 83 (9th Cir. 1980).
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cord constituted affirmative misconduct, and remanded for consider-
ation the petition under the circumstances existing during the time
the INS should have acted.2 5 Following remand from the Supreme
Court,226 the Ninth Circuit affirmed its original decision.
2 7
The Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion, reversed. 8 The
Court relied on a presumption of regularity to explain the lengthy
delay in adjudicating the petition and emphasized the deference to
be accorded to the decisions of the INS.
229
The question of when the government may be estopped was not
addressed by the Supreme Court despite lack of guidance for the
circuit courts on this issue.23 0 Although the Supreme Court had pre-
viously left open the possibility that estoppel could apply in an immi-
gration context, 23 1 it did not, in Miranda, expand upon when this
opportunity might present itself. The Court characterized govern-
mental failure to fulfill its duty as "questionable," particularly when
compared to governmental's "clear error" in Hibi. The court com-
mented that if the "clear error" presented by Hibi failed to justify
estoppel, then "neither the Government's conduct nor the harm to
the respondent [was] sufficient to estop the Government from enforc-
ing the conditions imposed by Congress for residency in this
country."232
225. Id. at 84.
226. INS v. Miranda, 454 U.S. 808 (1981).
227. Miranda v. INS, 673 F.2d 1105 (9th Cir. 1982). The Supreme Court had
remanded to allow the Ninth Circuit to consider the applicability of Schweiker v. Han-
sen, 450 U.S. 785 (1981). The Ninth Circuit found the case inapplicable.
228. INS v. Miranda, 459 U.S. 14 (1982).
229. Montana and Hibi make clear that neither the Government's conduct nor
the harm to the respondent is sufficient to estop the Government from enforcing
the conditions imposed by Congress for residency in this country ....
Enforcing the immigration laws, and the conditions for residency in this country, is be-
coming more difficult .... Moreover, the INS is the agency primarily charged by Con-
gress to implement the public policy underlying these laws .... Appropriate deference
must be accorded its decisions.
Id. at 283-84.
230. See, e.g., Hansen, 450 U.S. at 790 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Corniel-Rodri-
guez, 532 F.2d at 307; United States v. Lazy FC Ranch, 481 F.2d 985 (9th Cir. 1973);
United States v. Fox Lake State Bank, 366 F.2d 962 (7th Cir. 1966); Walsonavich v.
United States, 335 F.2d 96 (3d Cir. 1964); Simmons v. United States, 308 F.2d 938 (5th
Cir. 1962); Semaan v. Mumford, 335 F.2d 704 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Eichelberger v. Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue, 88 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1937). See generally K DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES § 17.01 (1976); Veldman, Estopping the Gov-
ernment in Immigration Cases: The Immigration Estoppel Light Remains Cautionary
Yellow, 56 NOTRE DAME LAW. 731 (1981); Note, Equitable Estoppel of the Govern-
ment, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 551 (1979).
231. E.g., Hibi, 414 U.S. at 5; Montana, 366 U.S. at 308.
232. Miranda, 459 U.S. at 18.
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The Supreme Court decision does not affect the law with respect
to the denial of estoppel in immigration cases in at least two situa-
tions. First, pursuant to Hibi, a benefit available by statute but
whose availability is foreclosed by the failure of the United States
government to publicize the availability of those benefits and to au-
thorize an individual to effect the grant of those benefits, does not
give rise to estoppel. Second, pursuant to the Ninth Circuit decision
in Santiago, the failure of a consular official to advise, as mandated
by regulation, a visa recipient of the terms of that visa, or of the
failure of the INS officer at the port of entry to similarly advise the
recipient, will not give rise to estoppel where the individual is errone-
ously admitted. This holds true unless, pursuant to the decision of
the Second Circuit in Corniel-Rodriguez, that individual can demon-
strate poor education and singular naivete.2 33
Miranda appears to eliminate further, however, the possibility of
estoppel against the government in a third situation, that of unrea-
sonable delay. 234 Miranda, in foreclosing this possibility, disregards
the plight of individuals, many of whom perceive themselves as pit-
ted against a huge bureaucracy infamous for its delays in adjudicat-
233. But see Mukherjee v. INS, - F. Supp. - (D. Ore. Civil No. 84-564, Jan. 3,
1985).
234. The Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion, recently expressed its displea-
sure with the application of estoppel in a non-immigration delay context. Hansen, 450
U.S. at 785, involved the possible estoppel of the Social Security Administration from
denying benefits to the respondent. The respondent was eligible for such benefits but had
not filed a written application due to a claims representative's erroneous statement and
neglect of the Claims Manual. In reversing the Second Circuit, 619 F.2d 942 (2d Cir.
1980), the Court observed that (1) "the duty of all courts [is] to observe the conditions
defined by Congress for charging the public treasury" (quoting Federal Crop Insurance
Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 385 (1947); (2) the Claims Manual was not a regulation
and has no legal force; and (3) respondent's resulting failure to satisfy a procedural re-
quirement rather than substantive ineligibility was insufficient to justify estoppel. Han-
sen, 450 U.S. at 788-90. Marshall, in dissent, noted that the majority's summary disposi-
tion of the case left lower courts guessing as to "whether the factual differences cited by
the majority are of any real consequence." Hansen, 450 U.S. at 792.
It appears from the Court's decision in Miranda that such distinctions are insignifi-
cant. The Supreme Court remanded that case to the Ninth Circuit for reconsideration in
light of Hansen. The Ninth Circuit, finding no impact upon the public fisc, reaffirmed its
original determination, 673 F.2d 1105 (9th Cir. 1982). The Supreme Court reversed,
without addressing Hansen's applicability. 103 S.Ct. 281 (1982).
More recently, the Tenth Circuit in Che-Li Shen v. INS, 749 F.2d 1469 (1984), found
in an immigration context that the agency would not be estopped from deporting the
individual even though INS took almost three years to adjudicate an application for ad-
justment of status and an additional two years elapsed before the denial of his renewed
application in deportation proceedings. The court relied upon a four-prong test: (1) the
party to be estopped must know the facts; (2) that party must intend that his conduct be
acted upon or must act so that the party asserting estoppel has the right to believe that it
was so intended; (3) the latter must be ignorant of the these facts; and (4) he must rely
on the first party's conduct to his injury. The court here found no detrimental reliance
and therefore never reached considerations of public policy relevant to estopping the gov-
ernment. See also Hassanali v. Attorney General, 599 F. Supp. 189 (D.D.C. 1984).
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ing applications. 35 This reality, although ignored by the Supreme
Court, appears to be well recognized by the circuit courts.
Wright's objection to majority invocation of estoppel in Sun IL
Yoo appears to be well-founded. There appears to be little factual
distinction between the Hibi situation, where there was an absolute
right but no opportunity to naturalize because of government action,
and the Yoo situation, which involved a filed application for certain
benefits but which suffered prejudice as the result of delay. The situ-
ations are distinguishable only because Hibi did not actually apply
for the benefits. Such application, however, would have been a futile
act.2 3
6
One commentator has suggested the adoption of a two-part formu-
lation by which to judge the applicability of equitable estoppel in
any given case.237 This approach, while including government silence
as the basis for estoppel, fails to give guidance as to when silence
becomes actionable. Such guidance is crucial when dealing with an
235. See. e.g., Trillin, Profiles: Making Adjustments, The New Yorker 50 (May
28, 1984). For a discussion of INS management problems, see H.R REP. No. 96-821,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); H.R. REP. No. 96-1459, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
236. Resort to administrative remedies is not required where (1) there is no ade-
quate administrative remedy. Rhodes v. United States, 574 F.2d 1179, 1181 (5th Cir.
1978); (2) there are extensive administrative delays which render administrative reme-
dies inadequate. Camenish v. University of Texas, 616 F.2d 127, 134 (5th Cir. 1980); (3)
there is a clear showing of irreparable injury. Rhodes, 574 F.2d at 1181; (4) there is a
substantial showing that the plaintiff's constitutional rights are being violated. McClen-
don v. Jackson Television, Inc., 603 F.2d 1174, 1177 (5th Cir. 1979). See generally K.
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES § 20 (1976).
237. Veldman, supra note 231. Veldman postulated that the demonstration of five
criteria should give rise to a rebuttable presumption that estoppel should apply:
(1) The government must engage in conduct - acts, language, or silence -
amounting to a representation or concealment of a material fact.
(2) The government must know the true facts at the time of its questioned
conduct, or at least the circumstances must be such that the Government must
reasonably be expected to possess such knowledge.
(3) The government must intend that its conduct shall be acted on or must so
act that the alien has a right to believe it is so intended.
(4) The alien must be ignorant of the true facts at the time of the questioned
conduct and at the time he acted upon such conduct.
(5) The alien must rely to his detriment on the questioned conduct of the
government.
If the government successfully rebuts the showing of these five elements, the court must
balance the equities and must necessarily consider the seriousness of the injustice caused
by the government misconduct; the duration of the alien's United States residency; the
likelihood of family separation; the loss of eligibility to a previously available right; the
type of right affected; and damage to the public interest, e.g., loss of legal protections,
monetary costs, the effect on the separation of powers, and the "sovereign" nature of the
immigration function. Id. at 740-41.
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agency to which the Supreme Court has expressed deference2 38 and
whose "normal" processing time for applications may run into
years. 23 9 The danger of government silence does not lie in its reflec-
tion of possible administrative backlog, although this is a serious
problem in itself as circumstances may change drastically during
such time. Rather, the danger resides in government silence being
interpreted by an alien as tacit approval of the form of his applica-
tion, if not the substance.2 40 Additionally, this formulation fails to
address circumstances where the INS accepts applications for one
purpose and refuses to do so for another.241
Collateral Estoppel
Subsequent to Hibi, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California was confronted with the same fac-
tual situation in In re Naturalization of 68 Filipino War Veter-
ans.242 The court divided the petitioners into three categories: (I)
those individuals who, prior to the statutory deadline, actually filed
an application or inquired as to the means by which they could natu-
ralize; 243 (II) petitioners who, like Hibi, although qualified for natu-
ralization benefits under the relevant provisions, failed to take action;
and (III) individuals in the same position as those in Category II,
but who were unable to provide proof of their qualifying military
service. Petitioners premised their claim to naturalization benefits on
governmental denial of due process, rather than on equitable estop-
pel.2 " The court ruled that petitioners in Categories I and II were
238. See, e.g., Miranda, 459 U.S. at 19.
239. For instance, the Houston office of the INS indicated in its August 1984
"Date of Application and Petitions Being Processed at the Houston District Office" that
N-400's (Applications to Final Hearing) were backlogged to June 1983. The San
Antonio office indicated in its August 8, 1984, "Progress Report of Applications or Peti-
tions Presently Being Adjudicated" that N-400's were backlogged 365 days.
240. See, e.g., Jung Been Suh v. INS, 592 F.2d 230 (5th Cir. 1979).
241. One lower court held that although the government had recognized a
Ghanaian divorce as valid when it approved the immediate relative visa petition based on
the alien's subsequent marriage to a United States citizen, the INS was not equitably
estopped from challenging the validity of that Ghanaian divorce and requiring that it be
properly proved for the alien's second preference visa petition for his third wife. Lokko v.
INS, No. 83 Civ. 4353 (Mel) (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 1984) (available Oct. 12, 1985, on
LEXIS, Genfed library, dist. file).
242. 406 F. Supp. 931 (N.D. Ca. 1975).
243. Petitioners in Category I relied upon In re Vacontios Petition, 475 F.2d 7 (9th
Cir. 1973). For another Category I case, see In re Petition for Naturalization of Cande-
lario T. Trial, Pet. No. 30801 (San Diego, Ca., July 27, 1984).
244. The court found Hibi not controlling, despite the similarity of the factual
situations.
While the Court cannot lightly disregard a Supreme Court decision dealing
with the precise factual situation presented here, the Court notes again that
Hibi was a summary reversal decided solely on the basis of a petition for cer-
tiorari without the benefit of full briefs and oral argument. The Supreme Court
itself has recognized that a summary disposition of a case wherein a constitu-
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entitled to the naturalization benefits claimed. The government filed
a notice of appeal in 68 Filipinos, but subsequently withdrew its ap-
peal with respect to Categories I and II veterans.a45 The government
later reversed its position with respect to Category II applications,
and now opposes such applications.
Subsequent to 68 Filipinos, two district courts held the govern-
ment collaterally estopped from relitigating the constitutional issue
resolved in that case.2 46 The Second Circuit, facing the same issue,
found that the government was not collaterally estopped by 68 Fili-
pinos from contesting a naturalization petition premised on similar
facts.247 The same issue later confronted the Ninth Circuit in Men-
doza v. United States,248 involving a Category II veteran.
The Ninth Circuit, after reviewing the consequences of collateral
estoppel against the government, ultimately concluded that collateral
estoppel in Mendoza would not be unfair. Concluding that the gov-
ernment "had every incentive to litigate vigorously the issue in 68
tional issue was raised and presented to the Court in oral argument, but was
not treated substantively in the Court's opinion, is "obviously . . .not of the
same precedential value as would be an opinion of this Court treating the ques-
tion on the merits."
68 Filipinos, 406 F. Supp. at 943 (quoting Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671
(1974)). The district court found that Hibi did not address the constitutional issues and
could not, therefore, bar the constitutional claim presented by 68 Filipinos.
245. Mendoza v. United States, 672 F.2d 1320, 1324 (9th Cir. 1982), appeal dis-
missed, (U.S. Nov. 30, 1977) (No. 76-1832). The Commissioner of Immigration testified
before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship and International
Law on February 8, 1978, that the government had originally filed its appeal on the
grounds that 68 Veterans was inconsistent with the Supreme Court decision in Hibi. He
explained the basis for the withdrawal of the appeal:
[H]owever, upon examining this issue, I became convinced that the District
Court's decision in 68 Filipinos was based upon sound legal reasoning, and that
there was also strong humanitarian reasons for not pursuing the appeal. I
therefore recommended to the Solicitor General that the government's appeal
be withdrawn, and the decision of the District Court be allowed to stand.
55 INTERPRETER RELEASES (Feb. 24, 1978).
246. Petition of Nisperos, 471 F. Supp. 296 (C.D. Cal. 1979); Petition of Crispulo
Columna Colmenar, No. 308-P-22551 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 1979).
The issue of the offensive application of collateral estoppel arises "when the plaintiff
seeks to foreclose the defendant from litigating an issue the defendant has previously
litigated unsuccessfully in an action with another party." Parklane Hosiery Company,
Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n.4 (1979).
247. Olegario v. United States, 629 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied 450 U.S.
980 (1981). The Olegario Court found that the relevant statutory provisions delegated to
the Attorney General sufficient discretion in the implementation of the naturalization
procedures so as to negate any claim that the failure to appoint an examiner constituted
a violation of due process.
248. 672 F.2d 1320 (9th Cir. 1982). See also Barretto v. United States, 694 F.2d
603 (9th Cir. 1982).
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Filipinos" and to pursue an appeal of the adverse judgment,24 9 the
court found that the unfairness resulting from the Second Circuit's
inconsistent decision was no greater than the unfairness resulting
from any disagreement between circuits. Consequently there existed
no "critical" need to redetermine veteran rights.2 50
The Supreme Court reversed unanimously the Ninth Circuit deci-
sion by finding the position of the United States as a party so signifi-
cantly different from that of a private litigant as to justify the non-
application of nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel.25x The Court
held that the Solicitor General, unlike a private litigant, must con-
sider a variety of factors prior to pursuing an appeal. It noted that
policy choices made by one administration may be re-evaluated by
the next one. The Court speculated that allowing nonmutual offen-
sive collateral estoppel against the government would prevent the
ongoing development of law on important issues.2 52 The Ninth Cir-
cuit's required showing of a "crucial need" to redetermine the origi-
nal issues was criticized as "so wholly subjective that it affords no
guidance to the courts or to the government." '253
The Supreme Court reasoning in Mendoza was neither realistic
nor faultless. Private litigants may well consider many factors prior
to pursuing an appeal, including the expense of continuing litigation,
the possibility of any settlement, and the emotional aspects of deal-
ing with a still unresolved and costly court case. Supreme Court crit-
icism of the Ninth Circuit "subjective" requirement of "crucial
need" applies equally well to its own refusal to deal comprehensively
with the circumstances in which equitable estoppel may apply.
More troubling is Supreme Court deference to the shifting policies
of different administrations. It is the executive branch of the govern-
ment which channels government litigation through the courts.2 54
Supreme Court refusal to allow nonmutual offensive collateral estop-
pel against the government evinces a willingness to allow political
choices to dictate, via the courts, the existence and extent of various
rights already determined by the legislature. And, in the case of the
249. Mendoza, 672 F.2d at 1327.
250. Id. at 1329.
251. United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154 (1984). The government, however,
has attempted to use findings of facts in Olegario, 629 F.2d at 204, in the context of
litigation with other Filipino war veterans.
252. A rule allowing nonmutual collateral estoppel against the government in
such cases would substantially thwart the development of important questions of
law by freezing the first final decision rendered on a particular legal issue. Al-
lowing only one final adjudication would deprive this Court of the benefit it
receives from permitting several courts of appeals to explore a difficult question
before this Court grants certiorari.
Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 160.
253. Id. at 162.
254. R. NEELY, How COURTS GOVERN AMERICA 216 (1981).
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Filipino war veterans, it permits the government the luxury of "clean
error" and unfulfilled commitments. 55
CONCLUSION
Although the Ninth Circuit has been characterized as one of the
most liberal of the federal circuits,25 6 many of its decisions coincide
with those of other courts. Both the Seventh Circuit and the District
Court for the Southern District of New York reached similar conclu-
sions with respect to area control operations.2 57 The Board of Immi-
gration Appeals had previously applied the exclusionary rule to de-
portation proceedings.2 "5  The Second Circuit acknowledged the
applicability of Fleuti to section 244(a)(1) applications.259 Even
though the Ninth Circuit Kamheangpatiyooth formulation went be-
yond Fleuti, Fleuti itself supported the consideration of factors in
addition to those specifically stated.2 60 Both the Second and Fifth
Circuits have been willing to allow estoppel against the INS in ap-
propriate situations.26 1 Although many of these decisions have re-
sulted in an expansion and/or strengthening of individual rights vis-
a-vis the government, the Ninth Circuit cannot be characterized as
either radical or as out of step with other courts of appeals.
Recent Supreme Court decisions have resulted in the narrowing of
individual rights and a broadening of governmental discretion, par-
ticularly with respect to law enforcement functions. Although the
current Supreme Court is viewed as conservative in nature, it is per-
haps more accurate to view both the Supreme Court and the Ninth
Circuit court as activist courts, taking very different directions.
2 2
255. "[G]reat notions, like great men, should keep their word." Astrup v. INS,
402 U.S. 509 (1971).
256. See supra note 1.
257. See supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
258. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
259. See supra notes 123-26 and accompanying text.
260. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
261. See supra notes 206-09 and 217-18 and accompanying text.
262. Judges who perpetrate verbicide on the law are judicial activists. A judi-
cial activist is a judge who interprets the Constitution or a piece of legislation to
mean what it would have said if he instead of the Founding Fathers or Congress
had written it. Contrary to popular opinion, all judicial activists are not liberals.
Some of them are conservatives. A liberal judicial activist is a judge who ex-
pands the scope of a law by stretching its words beyond their true meaning, and
a conservative judicial activist is one who narrows the scope of a law by restrict-
ing their true meaning. Judicial activism of the right or left substitutes the per-
sonal will of the judges for the impersonal will of the law.
Ervin, Judicial Activism and Verbicide, in AcTIvISM By THE BRANCH OF THE LAST
RESORT: OF THE SEIZURE OF ABANDONED SWORDS AND PURSES (1984). "Verbicide" is
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Each court has evidenced a willingness to depart from precedent
in order to move in a particular direction2 63 despite our system's in-
trinsic limits upon such activism.2 "1 Such judicial activism disrupts
the fundamental theory of the separation of powers. 265 Additionally,
judicial activism places an inordinate burden upon the courts, results
in policy decisions which neither Congress nor the voters can easily
change, impairs the ability of the courts to gain acceptance of and
support for necessary and legitimate decisions, and instigates move-
ments to limit or eradicate judicial jurisdiction on controversial
the "violent treatment of a word with fatal results to its legitimate meaning, which is its
life." 0. HOLMES, AUTOCRAT AT THE BREAKFAST TABLE 9 (1955). The direction of court
activism is a function of the background, attitudes, and other attributes of the judges. M.
KLEIN, LAW, COURTS, AND POLICY 255 (1984). For biographical data on each of the
Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court judges, see CALIFORNIA COURTS AND JUDGES HAND-
BOOK (1984). See generally Snider, Researching the Person Under the Black Robe, 4
CAL. LAW. 21 (Nov. 1984). For one comment on the Supreme Court's current activism,
see supra note 102. One writer has suggested that whether the Ninth Circuit judges "are
'too activist' is a question crawling with complications and one perhaps best left to edito-
rial writers, talk-show hosts and other certified clairvoyants." Maher, supra note 2, at 67.
Contrast activism with the assumptions underlying judicial restraint:
One [assumption underlying judicial restraint] is history and that obligation
that constitutionalism imposes to adhere to the essential meaning put in the
document by its framers. A second is the intrinsically undemocratic nature of
the Supreme Court. A third is a corollary to the second, an abiding respect for
the judgments of those branches of government that are elected representatives
of their constituents. A fourth is the recognition that judicial error at this level
is more difficult of correction than other forms of judicial action. A fifth is
respect for the judgments of earlier courts. But [sixth], the essential feature of
judicial restraint that has gained most attention and aroused the greatest
doubts probably because few men are themselves big enough to abide by its
command - is the notion of rejection of personal preference.
P. KURLAND, MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER AND THE SUPREME COURT 5 (1971). Justice
Frankfurter has commented upon the need for judicial restraint.
It is not easy to stand aloof and allow want of wisdom to prevail, to disregard
one's own strongly held view of what is wise in the conduct of affairs. But it is
not the business of this Court to pronounce policy. It must observe a fastidious
regard for limitations on its own power, and this precludes the Court's giving
effect to its own notions of what is wise or politic. That self-restraint is of the
essence in the observation of the judicial oath, for the Constitution has not
authorized the judges to sit in judgment on the wisdom of what Congress and
the Executive Branch do ....
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 120 (1958).
263. The willingness to depart from stare decisis is characteristic of activist courts.
M. KLEIN, supra note 262, at 255. Ninth Circuit decisions may become precedent for
other circuits, but initially represent departures from the law as previously applied. E.g.,
Wadman v. INS, 329 812 (9th Cir. 1964).
264. U.S. CONST. arts. I, II, III. Such limits include the President, the states, the
lower courts, and the nature of the nation's majority coalition. M. KLEIN, supra note 262,
at 260-62. Even with these limits, some judicial policymaking is inevitable. Id. at 257.
265. M. WILKEY, AcTivisM BY THE BRANCH OF THE LAST RESORT: OF THE
SEIZURE OF ABANDONED SWORDS AND PURSES 3 (1984). "Were the power of judging
joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbi-
trary control, for the judge would then be the legislator. Were it joined to the executive
power, the judge might behave with all the violence of an oppressor." MADISON, THE
FEDERALIST No. 46 (quoting Montesquieu).
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266
issues.
This behavior may be due to the sheer wilfulness of both courts to
take activist positions.267 It is more likely, however, that this action
results from an effort by both courts to fill a void resulting from
Congress' abdication of its own responsibility for decisionmaking in
the area of immigration law.268 Both the Supreme Court and the
Ninth Circuit have chosen to fill this void in different manners.
One scholar has hypothesized as to the existence of two simultane-
ously existing systems, the myth system and the operational sys-
tem.269 The myth system operates as an ideal and results from the
fear of vicious tendencies in human nature. The operational system
represents how things actually work. The myth system is analogous
to a religion, providing the standards by which to judge the opera-
tional system. We demand that the courts deliver the results prom-
ised by the myth system and not delivered by the operational sys-
tem.270 The court will intervene, that is, become activist, where the
operational system breaks down to become a travesty of the myth
system. 71
The Ninth Circuit has consistently viewed existing rights of the
individual as absolute, requiring extreme situations to justify their
disturbance and constant vigilance against government misconduct
266. M. WILKEY, supra note 265, at 14-16.
267. Id. at 17.
268. Id. at 2.
Various presidential candidates in the 1984 presidential election have characterized
the United States borders as being "out of control" or as suffering from "hemorrhage."
Despite growing awareness of the need for a coherent immigration policy, neither the
executive nor the legislative branches have adopted such a policy. See id. One court, in a
different immigration context, commented on its function in relation to the role of the
other two governmental branches:
At root, the controversy here [the Cuban Freedom Flotilla], reflects a basic
contradiction between, on the one hand, America's tradition of providing sanc-
tuary for the homeless, the outcast and, particularly, the political refugee and,
on the other, our immigration laws. That tension finds expression in the dis-
comfiting question of who, and how many, can come to this country and in
what circumstances. Resolution of that tension through promulgation and en-
forcement of a coherent immigration policy is a matter within the provinces of
the Legislative and Executive Branches of government. This Court has neither
the willingness nor the competence to interject itself into the arena of immigra-
tion policy, except insofar as such a policy runs afoul of constitutional and
statutory safeguards ....
Pollgreen v. Morris, 496 F. Supp. 1042, 1049 (S.D. Fla. 1980) (emphasis added). For a
recent update on congressional efforts to address immigration reform, see The Policy
Dilemma, Trying to Stem the Illegal Tide, TIME, July 8, 1983 at 50-52.
269. R. NEELY, supra note 254, at 12-14.
270. Id. See also W. REISMAN, FOLDED Lias (1979).
271. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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to ensure their survival.2 72 The examined opinions of the Ninth Cir-
cuit develop a myth system portraying helpless victims at the mercy
of a huge, relentless, and unsympathetic bureaucracy. The court has
expressed its reluctance to act where Congress should act, but has
felt compelled to do so because of the existing void.273
The Supreme Court has also indicated its unwillingness to act
where Congress and the executive branch have abdicated their re-
sponsibility to do so. 2 7 4 It has, however, acted, and in a manner pre-
mised upon a significantly different myth system. The decisions of
the Supreme Court reflect a view of aliens as manipulative of an
already overburdened agency, trying its best to enforce the laws as
mandated by the executive and legislative branches. 275 The Supreme
Court views immigration as a function of the sovereign nature of
government, allowing little or no interference.
Each court is attempting to reconcile the existing operational sys-
tem with its own myth system. Each myth system, however, fails in
varying degrees to adequately allow for the possibility of modifica-
tion of the myth system itself, rather than modification of only the
operational system. The judges of each court need to review the posi-
tions which provide a basis for the decisions of the court and deter-
mine how closely geared those positions are to the day to day reali-
ties of the immigration situation. It may be that the reality lies
between the currently existing myths. This is the reality which the
judges must use as a basis for the development of a new and coher-
ent myth system or ideal, to which the operational system can be
272. The question of activism may reflect a basic difference of reading constitu-
tional commands in light of the judicial function, i.e., which constitutional commands are
absolute injunctions. H. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIARY: THE SUPREME COURT IN THE Gov-
ERNMENTAL PROCESS 200 (5th ed. 1980).
273. See, e.g., supra note 19.
274. See, e.g., supra notes 15 and 150 and accompanying text.
275. See, e.g., supra notes 23, 83, 99, 159, 200-01 and accompanying text.
To be sure, not all members of each court have views consistent with the activism/self-
restraint characterization. Judge Wallace of the Ninth Circuit appears to seek reconcilia-
tion of the operational system with the same myth system as a majority of the Supreme
Court. See, e.g., supra note 157. Justice Brennan's myth system, with which Justices
Marshall, Stevens, and White at varying times agree, appears to be the same as that of a
majority of the Ninth Circuit court. See, e.g., supra notes 26-31, 82-83, 99, 148-49 and
accompanying text.
For data regarding the nature and extent of the immigration "problem," see COMMU-
NITY RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, INC., UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS: THEIR IMPACT ON THE
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO (1980); COMPTROLLER GENERAL, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS OF
THE UNITED STATES: ILLEGAL ALIENS: ESTIMATING THEIR IMPACT ON THE UNITED
STATES (1980); COMPTROLLER GENERAL, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED
STATES: NUMBER OF UNDOCUMENTED ALIENS RESIDING IN THE UNITED STATES UN-
KNOWN (1981); SELECT COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY, SECOND
SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT (1980); P. EHRLICH, L. BILDERBACK, & A. EHRLICH, THE
GOLDEN DOOR: INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION, MEXICO, AND THE UNITED STATES (1979).
For a summary of the approaches of other countries to immigration and the problem of
illegal aliens, see U.S. Immigration Policy, NUESTRO, Aug. 1984, at 21-24.
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better adjusted.
Concurrently, the executive and legislative branches must assume
their responsibility for the adoption of legislation which provides ad-
equate measures and funding for enforcement and adjudication, and
for remedying those situations which justice and fair play abhor. The
legislature must address not only the issue of how many individuals
are to be admitted to this country and in what classifications, but the
status of those individuals vis-d.-vis the legal system, once they are
present in the United States. These branches have, to date, failed in
this responsibility. 2
76
276. Representative Peter W. Roding, Jr., Chairman of the House Judiciary Com-
mittee, has recognized the problems posed by continuous Congressional inaction:
As Americans, we must ask ourselves how much longer we are willing to pay
the moral, social, and economic price of avoiding our sovereign responsibility to
control our borders. I am fearful that unless Congress acts to address this prob-
lem now, the time may come when America is forced to close its door to every-
one. This would be a tragic outcome and must not be allowed to happen.
Representative Romano L. Mazzoli, Chairman of the Judiciary Committee's Subcom-
mittee on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law, has also addressed the issue:
"The immigration problem has not and will not go away on its own. Our job in Congress
must be to deal squarely with this nettlesome and vexing issue ... " 62 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 673-74 (July 26, 1985).
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